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Abstract
We show that obtainable equilibria of a multi-period nonatomic game can be used
by players in its large finite counterparts to achieve near-equilibrium payoffs. Such
equilibria in the form of random state-to-action rules are parsimonious in form and
easy to execute, as they are both oblivious of past history and blind to other players’
present states. Our transient results can be extended to a stationary case, where the
finite multi-period games are special discounted stochastic games. In both nonatomic
and finite games, players’ states influence their payoffs along with actions they take;
also, the random evolution of one particular player’s state is driven by all players’ states
as well as actions. The finite games can model diverse situations such as dynamic price
competition. But they are notoriously difficult to analyze. Our results thus suggest
ways to tackle these problems approximately.
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1 Introduction
We show that an equilibrium of a random multi-period game involving a continuum of
players can be used to achieve asymptotically equilibrium results for its large finite coun-
terparts. The latter finite games can model competitive situations involving random and
action-dependent evolution of players’ states which in turn influence period-wise payoffs.
Their complex natures make equilibria difficult to locate. In contrast, those for the former
continuum-player game are simple in form and relatively easy to obtain. Therefore, a bridge
between the two types of games can have broad practical implications.
The former continuum-player game can be termed more formally as a sequential semi-
anonymous nonatomic game (SSNG). In it, a continuum of players interact with one another
in multiple periods; also, each player’s one-time payoff and random one-period state tran-
sition are both swayed by his own state and action, as well as the joint distribution of
other players’ states and actions. This is indeed the anonymous sequential game studied
by Jovanovic and Rosenthal [16]. We use the name SSNG just to be consistent with the
single-period nonatomic-game (NG) literature, where anonymity has been reserved for a
more special case. An SSNG’s finite counterpart is almost the same except that only a finite
number of players are involved. This more realistic situation is much more difficult to handle.
In a few steps, we demonstrate the usefulness of an SSNG equilibrium in finite multi-
period games. First, in a precise language, Theorem 1 describes the gradual retreat of
randomness in finite games as the number n of players tends to +∞. This paves way for
Theorem 2, which states that an SSNG’s conditional equilibria, in terms of random state-to-
action rules, can be used by its large finite counterparts to reach asymptotically equilibrium
payoffs on average. A further refinement of this result is achieved in Theorem 3. The
above transient results can be extended to the stationary case involving discounted payoffs
and infinite horizons; see Theorem 4. The conditional equilibria that facilitate our study are
similar to well-understood distributional equilibria. Their existence is also directly verifiable.
One practical situation to which our results can be applied concerns dynamic price com-
petition. Here, players may be firms producing one identical product type, states may be
combinations of the firms’ inventory levels and other static or dynamic characteristics such as
unit costs, and actions may be unit prices the firms charge for the product. In every period,
the random demand arriving to a firm is dependent on not only its own price but also prices
charged by other competitors. The actual sales is further constrained by available inventory.
So the player’s one-time payoff is a function of both its own state (inventory and probably
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also cost) and action (price) and of the distribution of others’ actions (prices). Moreover,
the firm’s next-period inventory level depends on its current level, the random demand, and
potentially an exogenously given production schedule. So the random single-period state
transition is potentially a function of the same factors involved in the payoff.
It is a difficult task to predict or prescribe what inventory-dependent prices the firms will
or should charge over a finite time horizon. This can be further complicated by diverse sce-
narios where firms have different degrees of knowledge on their competitors’ inventory levels
and/or costs. Our results, on the other hand, will reveal that the nonatomic counterpart
SSNG is easier to tackle. Its equilibria can be plugged back to the actual finite-player situ-
ations, without regard to the particularities of the scenarios, and still make reasonably well
predictions/prescriptions when the number of players is large enough. We are not equipped
to answer how large is “large enough”. But computational study done in a related pricing
setting hinted that player numbers “in the tens” seem large enough; see, Yang and Xia [35].
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 surveys the relevant literature. We then spend
Sections 3 and 4 on essentials of SSNGs and finite games, respectively. In Section 5, we
demonstrate the key result that state evolutions in large finite games will not veer too
far away from their NG counterparts. Section 6 is devoted to the main transient result
and Section 7 its detailed interpretation. This result is extended to the stationary case in
Section 8. Implications of these results and existence of our kind of equilibria for SSNGs are
shown in Section 9. We conclude the paper in Section 10.
2 Literature Survey
From early on, NGs have been used as easier-to-analyze proxies of real finite-player situa-
tions, such as in the study of perfect competition. Systematic research on NG started with
Schmeidler [28]. He formulated a single-period semi-anonymous NG, wherein the joint dis-
tribution of other players’ identities and actions may affect any given player’s payoff. When
the action space is finite, Schmeidler established the existence of pure equilibria when the
game becomes anonymous, so that other players’ influence on a game’s outcome is chan-
neled through the marginal action distribution alone. Mas-Colell [24] showed the existence
of distributional equilibria in anonymous NGs with compact metric action spaces. The lat-
ter result was extended by Khan and Sun [20] to a case where players differ on how their
preferences over actions are influenced by external action distributions. A survey of related
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works up until the early 2000s was provided by Khan and Sun [23].
Much attention has been paid to the topic of pure-equilibrium existence. Khan and
Sun [21] developed a purification scheme involving a countable compact metric action space.
Khan and Sun [22] used non-standard measures on identity spaces and generalized Schmei-
dler’s pure-equilibrium existence result for more general action spaces. Balder [4] established
pure- and mixed-equilibrium existence results that may be regarded as generalizations of
Schmeidler’s corresponding results. Other notable works still include Yu and Zhang [36] and
Balder [5]. On the other hand, Khan, Rath, and Sun [18] identified a certain limit to which
Schmeidler’s result can be extended. Recently, Khan et al. [19] took players’ diverse bio-
social traits into consideration and pinpointed saturation of the player-identity distribution
as the key to existence of pure equilibria.
Links between NGs and their finite counterparts were covered in Green [13], Housman
[15], Carmona [8], Kalai [17], Al-Najjar [3], and Yang [33]. For multi-period games without
changing states, Green [12], Sabourian [27], and Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky [2] showed that
equilibria for large games are nearly myopic.
SSNGs are both challenging and rewarding to analyze because in them, very realistically,
individual states are subject to sways of players’ own actions as well as their opponents’
states and actions. Jovanovic and Rosenthal [16] established the existence of distributional
equilibria for such games. This result was generalized by Bergin and Bernhardt [6] to cases
involving aggregate shocks. In SSNGs’ finite-player counterparts, however, randomness in
state evolution will not go away. Besides, a player’s ability to observe other players’ states
and actions might also affect his decision. Presented with these difficulties, it is not surprising
that known results on sequential finite-player games are restricted to the stationary setting,
where they appear as discounted stochastic games first introduced by Shapley [29]. According
to Mertens and Parthasrathy [25], Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan [9], and
Solan [30], for instance, equilibria known to exist for these games come in quite complicated
forms that for real implementation, demand a high degree of coordination among players.
It is therefore natural to ask whether sequential finite-player games can be approximated
by their NG counterparts. This question has so far been answered by two unpublished arti-
cles. For a case unconcerned with the copula between marginal state and action distributions,
Bodoh-Creed [7] provided an affirmative answer, and went on to show for certain cases that
limits of large-game equilibria of a myopic form, when in existence, are NG equilibria. Also,
Yang [34] verified for the approximability when both state transitions and action plans are
4
driven by exogenously generated idiosyncratic shocks. Our current study attempts with the
most general possible setting, without unduly restricting on ways in which a player’s payoff
can be influenced by other players’ states and actions or ways in which the game can evolve
randomly. To achieve results of the same spirit, we have to overcome technical challenges
posed by the new phenomenon of sampling from non-product joint probabilities.
Some authors went on to pursue stationary equilibria (SE), which stressed the long-
run steady-state nature of individual action plans and system-wide multi-states; see, e.g.,
Hopenhayn [14] and Adlakha and Johari [1]. The oblivious equilibrium (OE) concept as
proposed by Weintraub, Benkard, and van Roy [31], in order to account for impacts of
large players, took the same stationary approach by letting participants beware of only long-
run average system states. Weintraub, Benkard, and van Roy [32] showed links between
equilibria of infinite-player games and their finite-player brethren for a setting where the
long-run average system state could be defined. Though applicable to many situations, we
caution that the implicit stationarity of SE or OE is incompatible with applications that are
transient by nature; for instance, the dynamic pricing game studied by Yang [34].
3 The Nonatomic Game
The SSNG is a game in which a continuum of players interact with one another over multiple
periods. A realistic and yet complicating feature is that players possess individual states
which influence their payoffs along with all players’ actions. The random evolutions of these
states, meanwhile, are affected by players’ actions. Furthermore, the semi-anonymous nature
of the game means that not only what was done, but also who did what to the extent at
which states partially reveal player identities, figure large in both payoff formation and state
evolution. We now provide a detailed account of the game.
3.1 Game Primitives
For some natural number t¯ ∈ N, we let periods 1, 2, ...., t¯ serve as regular periods and
period t¯ + 1 as the terminal period. For all periods, we let players’ individual states and
actions form, respectively, separable metric spaces S and X . We further require that both
spaces be discrete. In this paper, such a space always stands for a separable metric space
with countably many elements and the additional feature that the minimum of the distances
between any two points remains strictly positive. The discreteness requirement will be useful
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at one occasion. But most of our derivations will work if the spaces were merely separable
metric. Given any separable metric space A, we use B(A) for its Borel σ-field and P(A) for
the set of all probability measures on the measurable space (A,B(A)).
To each player, other players’ states and actions are immediately felt in a semi-anonymous
fashion, so that what really matters is the joint distribution of other players’ states and
actions. This distribution, which we dub “in-action environment”, is a member of the joint
state-action distribution space P(S×X). In any period t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, a player’s state s ∈ S,
his action x ∈ X , and the in-action environment τ ∈ P(S ×X) he faces, together determine
his payoff in that period. In particular, there is a function
f˜t : S ×X × P(S ×X)→ [−f¯t, f¯t], (1)
where f¯t is some positive constant on the real line R. It is required that f˜t(·, ·, τ) be a
measurable map from S × X to [−f¯t, f¯t] for every τ ∈ P(S × X). For the terminal period
t¯+ 1, we let the payoff be 0 in all circumstances.
Now we describe individual players’ random state transitions. Given separable metric
spaces A and B, we use K(A,B) to represent the space of all kernels from A to B. Each
member κ ∈ K(A,B) ⊆ (P(B))A satisfies that
(i) κ(a) is a member of P(B) for each a ∈ A, and
(ii) for each B′ ∈ B(B), the real-valued function κ(·|B′) is measurable.
Note that we have used κ(a|B′) rather than the more conventional κ(B′|a) to denote the
conditional probability for B′ ∈ B(B) when given a ∈ A. The current notation allows us to
always read a formula from left to right. Now in period 1, 2, ..., t¯, let there be a function
g˜t : S ×X × P(S ×X)→ P(S), (2)
so that g˜t(·, ·, τ) is a member of K(S ×X,S) for each τ ∈ P(S × X). For convenience, we
use G(S,X) to denote the space of all such functions, or what we shall call “state transition
kernels”. In period t, when a player is in individual state s ∈ S, takes action x ∈ X , and
faces in-action environment τ ∈ P(S ×X), there will be a g˜t(s, x, τ |S
′) chance for his state
in period t + 1 to be in any S ′ ∈ B(S).
This setup is versatile enough to embrace different player characteristics. For instance,
each s ∈ S may comprise two components θ and ω, with the g˜t’s defined through (2) dictating
that θ stays static over time to serve as a player’s innate type. Certainly, the f˜t’s defined
through (1) can have all kinds of trends over θ to reflect players’ varying payoff structures.
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3.2 Evolution of the Environments
In any period 1, 2, ..., t¯, t¯ + 1, by “pre-action environment” we mean the state distribution
σ ∈ P(S) of all players. With t¯, S, X , (f˜t|t = 1, 2, ..., t¯), and (g˜t|t = 1, 2, ..., t¯) all given in
the background, we use Γ(σ1) to denote an (SS)NG with σ1 ∈ P(S) as its initial period-1
pre-action environment. For this NG, we can use χ[1t¯] = (χt | t = 1, ..., t¯) ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯
to denote a policy profile. Here, each χt ∈ K(S,X) is a map from a player’s state to the
player’s random action choice. Together with the given initial environment σ1, this policy
profile will help to generate a deterministic pre-action environment trajectory σ[1,t¯+1] = (σt |
t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, t¯+1) ∈ (P(S))t¯+1 in an iterative fashion. This process is also intertwined with
the formation of in-action environments τ1, τ2, ..., τt¯ faced by all players in periods 1, 2, ..., t¯.
More notation is needed to precisely describe this evolution. Given distribution p ∈ P(A)
and kernel κ ∈ K(A,B) for separable metric spaces A and B, there is a natural product
p⊗ κ ∈ P(A× B), such that
(p⊗ κ)(A′ ×B′) =
∫
A′
p(da) · κ(a|B′), ∀A′ ∈ B(A), B′ ∈ B(B). (3)
Here, p⊗ κ is essentially the joint distribution generated by the marginal p and conditional
distribution κ. Obviously, (p⊗ κ)|A, the marginal of p⊗ κ on A, is p. At the same time, we
use p⊙ κ to denote the marginal (p⊗ κ)|B, which satisfies
(p⊙κ)(B′) = (p⊗κ)|B(B
′) = (p⊗κ)(A×B′) =
∫
A
p(da) ·κ(a|B′), ∀B′ ∈ B(B). (4)
Suppose pre-action environment σt ∈ P(S) has been given for some period t = 1, ..., t¯.
Then, for every player with starting state st in the period, his random action will be sampled
from the distribution χt(st|·) where as noted before, χt ∈ K(S,X) is every player’s behavioral
guide. Thus, all players will together form the commonly felt in-action environment
τt = σt ⊗ χt. (5)
For each individual player with state st and realized action xt, his state st+1 in period t+ 1
will, by (2), be distributed according to g˜t(st, xt, τt|·). Thus, it will be reasonable for the
pre-action environment in period t+ 1 to follow σt+1 = τt ⊙ g˜t(·, ·, τt), with
[τt ⊙ g˜t(·, ·, τt)](S
′) =
∫
S×X
τt(ds× dx) · g˜t(s, x, τt|S
′), ∀S ′ ∈ B(S). (6)
Although (6) has been intuitively reasoned from (2), we caution that logically it is part of
the NG’s definition rather than something derivable from the latter.
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The transition from σt to σt+1 through random action plan χt is best expressed by an
operator. For any kernel χ ∈ K(S,X), define operator Tt(χ) on the space P(S), so that
Tt(χ) ◦ σ = (σ ⊗ χ)⊙ g˜t(·, ·, σ ⊗ χ) = σ ⊙ χ⊙ g˜t(·, ·, σ ⊗ χ), ∀σ ∈ P(S). (7)
Basically, state distribution σ and random state-dependent action plan χ first fuse to form
the joint state-action distribution σ ⊗ χ to be felt by all players. The latter’s random state
transitions are then guided by the kernel g˜t(·, ·, σt⊗ χ). Subsequently, after “averaging out”
impacts of actions, the next-period state distribution will become σ⊙χ⊙ g˜t(·, ·, σ⊗χ). The
one-period pre-action environment transition is now representable by
σt+1 = Tt(χt) ◦ σt = σt ⊙ χt ⊙ g˜t(·, ·, σt ⊗ χt). (8)
For periods t and t′ with t ≤ t′, as well as sequence χ[tt′] = (χt′′ |t
′′ = t, ..., t′) of action
plans, we can iteratively define T[tt′](χ[tt′]), so that
T[tt′](χ[tt′]) ◦ σt = Tt′(χt′) ◦ (T[t,t′−1](χ[t,t′−1]) ◦ σt), ∀σt ∈ P(S). (9)
The left-hand side will be players’ state distribution in period t′ + 1 when they start period
t with the distribution σt and adopt the action sequence χ[tt′] in the interim. Note that
T[tt](χ[tt]) is nothing but Tt(χt). As a default, we let T[t,t−1] stand for the identity operator
on P(S). The environment trajectory σ[1,t¯+1] satisfies
σ[1,t¯+1] = (T[1,t−1](χ[1,t−1]) ◦ σ1 | t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, t¯+ 1). (10)
It is deterministic by definition.
4 The n-player Game
Let the same t¯, S, X , (f˜t|t = 1, 2, ..., t¯), and (g˜t|t = 1, 2, ..., t¯) remain in the background.
For some n ∈ N \ {1} and initial multi-state s1 = (s11, s12, ..., s1n) ∈ S
n, we can define an
n-player game Γn(s1), in which each s1m ∈ S is player m’s initial state. The game’s payoffs
and state evolutions are still described by the f˜t’s and g˜t’s, respectively. However, details are
messier as outside environments vary from player to player and their evolutions are random.
For a ∈ A, where A is again a separable metric space, we use δa to denote the singleton
Dirac measure with δa({a}) = 1. For a = (a1, ..., an) ∈ A
n where n ∈ N, we use εa for∑n
m=1 δam/n, the empirical distribution generated by the vector a. We also use Pn(A) to
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denote the space of probability measures of the type εa for a ∈ A
n, i.e., the space of empirical
distributions generated from n samples. Now back at the game Γn(s1), suppose in period
t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, each player m = 1, 2, ..., n is in state stm and takes action xtm. Then, the
in-action environment experienced by player 1 will be εst,−1xt,−1 = ε((st2,xt2),...,(stn,xtn)). Thus,
this player will receive payoff f˜t(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1) in the period, and his period-(t+ 1) state
st+1,1 will be sampled from the distribution g˜t(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1 |·).
Suppose χ[1t¯] = (χt | t = 1, ..., t¯) ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯ again describes the policy adopted by all
n players. Unlike in an NG, this time χ[1t¯] will help to generate a stochastic as opposed to
deterministic environment trajectory. To describe each one-period transition in this complex
process, we rely on the kernel χ nt ⊙ g˜
n
t ∈ K(S
n, Sn) defined by
(χ nt ⊙ g˜
n
t )(s|S
′) =
∫
Xn
χ nt (s|dx) · g˜
n
t (s, x|S
′), ∀s ∈ Sn, S ′ ∈ B(Sn), (11)
where χ nt is a member of K(S
n, Xn) that satisfies
χ nt (s|X
′
1 × · · · ×X
′
n) = Π
n
m=1χt(sm|X
′
m), ∀s ∈ S
n, X ′1, ..., X
′
n ∈ B(X), (12)
and g˜ nt is a member of K(S
n ×Xn, Sn) that satisfies
g˜ nt (s, x|S
′
1 × · · · × S
′
n) = Π
n
l=1g˜t(sl, xl, εs−lx−l|S
′
l),
∀(s, x) ∈ Sn ×Xn, S ′1, ..., S
′
n ∈ B(S).
(13)
In combination, (11) can be spelled out as
(χ nt ⊙ g˜
n
t )(s|S
′
1 × · · · × S
′
n) =
∫
Xn
Πnm=1χt(sm|dxm) · Π
n
l=1g˜t(sl, xl, εs−lx−l|S
′
l). (14)
The above reflects that, each player m samples his action xm from the distribution χt(sm|·);
once all players’ actions x = (x1, ..., xn) have been determined, each player l will face his
unique in-action environment εs−lx−l; thus, this player’s period-(t+ 1) state will be sampled
from the distribution g˜t(sl, xl, εs−lx−l|·).
When the n players start period t with a random multi-state with distribution πnt ∈
P(Sn) and they act according to random rule χt ∈ K(S,X) in the period, they will generate
the joint distribution µnt ∈ P(S
n ×Xn) of period-t multi-state and -action satisfying
µnt = πnt ⊗ χ
n
t . (15)
According to (3) and (12), the above means that, for any S ′ ∈ B(Sn) and X ′1, ..., X
′
n ∈ B(X),
µnt(S
′×X ′1×· · ·×X
′
n) =
∫
S′
πnt(ds)·χ
n
t (s|X
′
1×· · ·×X
′
n) =
∫
S′
πnt(ds)·Π
n
m=1χt(sm|X
′
m). (16)
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Clearly, (15) corresponds to (5) in the NG situation.
By (11), the period-(t+ 1) multi-state distribution µnt ⊙ g˜
n
t ∈ P(S
n) will follow
(µnt ⊙ g˜
n
t )(S
′) =
∫
Sn×Xn
µnt(ds× dx) · g˜
n
t (s, x|S
′), ∀S ′ ∈ B(Sn). (17)
Combining (15) and (17), we can see that the one-period transition between multi-states is
πn,t+1 = (πnt ⊗ χ
n
t )⊙ g˜
n
t = πnt ⊙ χ
n
t ⊙ g˜
n
t . (18)
Note (18) is the n-player game’s answer to the NG’s (8). Similar to (9), for t ≤ t′, the
distribution πnt′ of period-t
′ multi-state st′ is given by
πnt′ = πnt ⊙ Π
t′−1
t′′=t(χ
n
t′′ ⊙ g˜
n
t′′). (19)
When the initial multi-state s1 is randomly drawn from distribution πn1, the entire trajectory
πn,[1,t¯+1] = (πnt|t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, t¯ + 1) of the n-player game’s multi-state distributions can be
written as
πn,[1,t¯+1] = (πn1 ⊙ Π
t−1
t′=1(χ
n
t′ ⊙ g˜
n
t′ )|t = 1, 2, .., t¯, t¯ + 1). (20)
When all players’ states are sampled from some σ1 ∈ P(S), we still have (20) as the trajectory
for multi-state distributions, but with πn1 = σ
n
1 . When recognizing πn1 = δs1 , the Dirac
measure in P(Sn) that assigns the full weight to s1, (20) will help describe the evolution of
the multi-state distribution for the n-player game Γn(s1), much like (10) did for Γ(σ1).
5 Convergence of Aggregate Environments
Even before touching upon notions like cumulative payoffs and equilibria, we can already
introduce an interesting link between finite games and NGs. It is in terms of an asymp-
totic relationship between a sequence πn,[t,t¯+1] = (πnt′ |t
′ = t, t + 1, ..., t¯ + 1) of multi-state
distributions in n-player games and a sequence σ[t,t¯+1] = (σt′ |t
′ = t, t + 1, ..., t¯ + 1) of state
distributions in their NG counterparts. The message is that, when starting from similar
environments in period t and adopting the same action plan from that period on, stochastic
environment paths experienced by large finite games will not drift too much away from the
NG’s deterministic environment trajectory. We refrain from using the word convergence
because the πnt′ ’s reside in different spaces for different n’s.
First, we propose the concept asymptotic resemblance in order to precisely describe
the way in which members in a sequence of probability measures increasingly resemble the
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products of a given measure. For a separable metric space A, the space P(A) is metrized by
the Prohorov metric ρA, which induces the weak topology on it. At fixed n ∈ N, the map
ε(·) from A
n to Pn(A) ⊆ P(A) is continuous. Therefore, for any p ∈ P(A) and ǫ > 0, the set
{a ∈ An|ρA(εa, p) < ǫ} is an open subset of A
n and thus a member of B(An).
Definition 1 For a separable metric space A, suppose p ∈ P(A) and for each n ∈ N,
qn ∈ P(A
n). We say that sequence qn asymptotically resembles the sequence p
n made up of
p’s n-th order products p× · · · × p, if for any ǫ > 0 and n that is large enough,
qn({a ∈ A
n|ρA(εa, p) < ǫ}) > 1− ǫ.
Definition 1 says that sequence qn will asymptotically resemble the sequence p
n of product
measures when the empirical distribution εa of a random vector a = (a1, ..., an), sampled
from qn, is highly likely to be close to p as n approaches +∞. This resemblance notion is
consistent with Prohorov’s theorem (Parthasarathy [26], Theorem II.7.1), whose weak version
is presented as Lemma 2 in Appendix A. Due to it, any sequence (p′)n will asymptotically
resemble the sequence pn if and only if p′ = p.
Some results related to the resemblance concept have been placed in Appendix A. Lemma 3
stems from Dvoretzky, Kiefer, and Wolfolwitz’s [10] inequality and makes the convergence
in Lemma 2 uniform in the chosen probability p. According to Lemma 4, the tampering of
one component within any n-long vector a ∈ An would not much alter εa. It is therefore
natural for Lemma 5 to state that the resemblance of qn to p
n would lead to that of the
An−1-marginal qn|An−1 to p
n−1. Lemma 6 says that the above would also lead to the asymp-
totic resemblance of p′×qn−1 to p
n for any p′. So in general there can be nothing substantial
regarding the relationship between the A-marginals qn|A and p. Finally, Lemma 7 shows
that asymptotic resemblance is preserved under the projection of A×B into A.
The following one-step result states that asymptotic resemblance concerning pre-action
environments is translatable into that concerning in-action environments; also, the same
resemblance is preserved after undergoing one single step in a game.
Proposition 1 Let state distribution σ ∈ P(S), random state-dependent action plan χ ∈
K(S,X), and state-transition kernel g ∈ G(S,X), with the latter enjoying the continuity of
g(s, x, τ) in the joint state-action distribution τ at an (s, x)-independent rate. Also, multi-
state distribution πn ∈ P(S
n) for each n ∈ N. Suppose further that the sequence πn asymp-
totically resembles the sequence σn. Then,
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(i) the sequence πn ⊗ χ
n will asymptotically resemble the sequence (σ ⊗ χ)n, and
(ii) the sequence πn⊙χ
n⊙gn will asymptotically resemble the sequence (σ⊙χ⊙g(·, ·, σ⊗
χ))n.
Indeed, (ii) remains valid under mild contamination. That is, for any (s, x) ∈ S ×X,
(iii) the sequence (δsx × (πn−1 ⊗ χ
n−1))⊙ gn will asymptotically resemble the sequence
(σ ⊙ χ⊙ g(·, ·, σ ⊗ χ))n at a rate independent of the chosen (s, x).
Proposition 1 is one of our two most technical results. Its proof invokes both Prohorov’s
theorem (Parthasarathy [26], Theorem II.7.1) on the convergence of empirical distributions
and for parts (ii) and (iii), Dvoretzky, Kiefer, and Wolfolwitz’s [10] inequality which provides
the uniformity of such convergence. In the proposition, part (i) stresses the passibility from
convergence of pre-action environments to that of same-period in-action environments, see (5)
and (15); part (ii) further points out that convergence in next-period pre-action environments
will follow suit, see (8) and (18); also, part (iii) will be useful when we take the view point
from one single player..
To take advantage of Proposition 1, we now assume the equi-continuity of the state
transitions with respect to in-action environments.
Assumption 1 Each transition kernel g˜t(s, x, τ) is continuous in τ at an (s, x)-independent
rate. That is, for any in-action environment τ ∈ P(S ×X) and ǫ > 0, there is δ > 0, such
that for any τ ′ ∈ P(S ×X) satisfying ρS×X(τ, τ
′) < δ and any (s, x) ∈ S ×X,
ρS(g˜t(s, x, τ), g˜t(s, x, τ
′)) < ǫ.
We are in a position to derive this section’s main result. It states that, when an NG and its
finite counterparts evolve under the same action plan, environment pathways of large finite
games, though stochastic, will resemble the deterministic pathway of the NG.
Theorem 1 Let a policy profile χ[tt¯] ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯−t+1 for periods t, t + 1, ..., t¯ be given.
When st = (st1, ..., stn) has a distribution πnt that asymptotically resembles σ
n
t , the series
(πnt⊙Π
t′−1
t′′=t(χ
n
t′′⊙ g˜
n
t′′) | t
′ = t, t+1, ..., t¯, t¯+1) will asymptotically resemble ((T[t,t′−1](χ[t,t′−1])◦
σt)
n | t′ = t, t+ 1, ..., t¯, t¯+ 1) as well. That is, for any ǫ > 0 and any n that is large enough,
[πnt ⊙ Π
t′−1
t′′=t(χ
n
t′′ ⊙ g˜
n
t′′)](A˜nt′(ǫ)) > 1− ǫ, ∀t
′ = t, t+ 1, ..., t¯+ 1,
where for each t′, the set of multi-states A˜nt′(ǫ) ∈ B(S
n) is such that,
ρS(εst′ , T[t,t′−1](χ[t,t′−1]) ◦ σt) < ǫ, ∀st′ ∈ A˜nt′(ǫ).
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Suppose an NG starts period t with pre-action environment σt and a slew of finite games
start the period with pre-action environments that are ever nearly sampled from σt. Let the
evolution of both types of games be guided by players acting according to the same policy
profile χ[tt¯]. Then, as the numbers of players n involved in finite games grow indefinitely,
Theorem 1 predicts for ever less chances for the finite games’ period-t′ environments εst′ to be
even slightly away from the NG’s deterministic period-t′ environment T[t,t′−1](χ[t,t′−1])◦σt. For
some fixed σ1 ∈ P(S), we can plug t = 1 and πn1 = σ
n
1 into Theorem 1. Then, we will obtain
the proximity between σ n[1,t¯+1] = (σ
n
t |t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, t¯+1) and πn,[1,t¯+1] = (πnt|t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, t¯+
1) for large n’s, where every σt = T[1,t−1](χ[1,t−1]) ◦ σ1 and every πnt = σ
n
1 ⊙Π
t−1
t′=1(χ
n
t′ ⊙ g˜
n
t′ ).
In view of (10) and (20), this means that when large games sample their initial states from an
NG’s starting distribution σ1, the former games’ state-distribution trajectories will remain
close to that of the latter game.
Our confinement so far to discrete spaces S and X arises mainly from the need to deal
with non-product joint probabilities of the form p⊗ κ; see (3). In Yang [34], where random
state transitions and random action plans were modeled through independently generated
shocks, only results pertaining to product-form probabilities p × q, where q is an ordinary
rather than conditional probability, were needed. Because of this, known properties like
Propositions III.4.4 and III.4.6 of Ethier and Kurtz [11] could be put to good use. Results
there could thus be based on complete state and shock spaces. In contrast, if we were to
consider more general spaces here, we would face the presently unsurmountable challenge of
passing the closeness between measures p and pi for i = 1, 2, ..., n onto that between p
n and∏n
i=1 pi when n itself tends to infinity.
6 NG and Finite-game Equilibria
We present this paper’s main result that an NG equilibrium, though oblivious of past history
and blind to other players’ states, will generate minimal regrets when adopted by players in
large finite games. First, we introduce equilibrium concepts used in both types of games.
6.1 Equilibria in NG
In defining the NG Γ(σ1)’s equilibria, we subject a candidate policy profile to one-time
deviation of a single player, who is by default infinitesimal in influence. Note the deviation
will not alter the environment trajectory corresponding to the candidate profile. With this
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understanding, we define vt(st, ξ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯]) as the total expected payoff a player can receive
from period t to t¯, when he starts with state st ∈ S and adopts action plan ξ[tt¯] = (ξt, ..., ξt¯) ∈
(K(S,X))t¯−t+1 throughout, while other players form initial pre-action environment σt ∈ P(S)
and adopt policy profile χ[tt¯] = (χt, ..., χt¯) ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯−t+1 throughout. As a terminal
condition, we certainly have
vt¯+1(st¯+1, σt¯+1) = 0. (21)
For t = t¯, t¯− 1, ..., 1, we have the recursive relationship
vt(st, ξ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯]) =
∫
X
ξt(st|dxt) · [f˜t(st, xt, σt ⊗ χt)
+
∫
S
g˜t(st, xt, σt ⊗ χt|dst+1) · vt+1(st+1, ξ[t+1,t¯], Tt(χt) ◦ σt, χ[t+1,t¯])].
(22)
This is because the player’s action is guided in a random fashion by ξt, its payoff is determined
by f˜t, its state evolution is governed by g˜t, and its future payoff is supplied by vt+1; also, after
undergoing the commonly adopted action plan χt, the period-(t+1) pre-action environment
σt+1 will be Tt(χt) ◦ σt as shown in (8). The choice of ξt affects the current player’s period-t
action xt, his period-(t + 1) state st+1, and his future state-action trajectory. However, the
change at this negligible player does not alter the period-t in-action environment σt ⊗ χt as
listed in (5) or any environment in the future. This is the main reason why NGs are easier
to handle than their finite-player counterparts.
Now, we deem policy χ[1t¯] ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯ a Markov equilibrium for the game Γ(σ1) when,
for every t = 1, 2, ..., t¯ and ξt ∈ K(S,X),
vt(st, χ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯]) ≥ vt(st, (ξt, χ[t+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯]), ∀st ∈ S, (23)
where
σt = T[1,t−1](χ[1,t−1]) ◦ σ1. (24)
That is, policy χ[1t¯] will be regarded an equilibrium when no player can be better off by
unilaterally deviating to any alternative plan ξt ∈ K(S,X) in any single period t. The
definition of σt in (24) underscores the evolution of the deterministic environment trajectory
following the adoption of action plan χ[1t¯] by almost all players.
6.2 ǫ-Equilibria in n-player Games
For an n-player game, let vnt(st1, ξ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯]) be the total expected payoff player 1 can
receive from period t to t¯, when he starts with state st1 ∈ S and adopts action plan
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ξ[tt¯] ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯−t+1 throughout, while other players form initial empirical state distribution
εst,−1 = ε(st2,...,stn) ∈ Pn−1(S) and adopt action plan χ[tt¯] ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯−t+1 throughout. As a
terminal condition, we have
vn,t¯+1(st¯+1,1, εst¯+1,−1) = 0. (25)
For t = t¯, t¯− 1, ..., 1, we have the recursive relationship
vnt(st1, ξ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯]) =
∫
X
ξt(st1|dxt1) ·
∫
Xn−1
χ n−1t (st,−1|dxt,−1)×
×[f˜t(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1) +
∫
Sn
g˜ nt (st, xt|dst+1) · vn,t+1(st+1,1, ξ[t+1,t¯], εst+1,−1, χ[t+1,t¯])],
(26)
where the meaning of χ n−1t (st,−1|dxt,−1) follows from (12) and that of g˜
n
t (st, xt|dst+1) follows
from (13). Note (26) differs substantially from its NG counterpart (22). With only a finite
number of players, player 1’s one-time choice ξt not only affects his own future actions and
states as before, but differently, starting from the altered in-action environment εstxt , it also
impacts the entire future trajectory of all other players. Note εstxt impacts the generation
of st+1 = (st+1,1, ..., st+1,n) in its projections to n different (n − 1)-dimensional spaces, as
according to (13),
∫
Sn
g˜ nt (st, xt|dst+1) amounts to Π
n
m=1
∫
S
g˜t(stm, xtm, εst,−mxt,−m|dst+1,m).
For each n ∈ N\{1}, let πˆn−1,[1t¯] = (πˆn−1,t | t = 1, ..., t¯) ∈ (P(S
n−1))t¯ be a series of other-
player multi-state distributions. For ǫ ≥ 0, we deem χ[1t¯] = (χt | t = 1, ..., t¯) ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯ an
ǫ-Markov equilibrium for the game family (Γn(s1) | s1 ∈ S
n) in the sense of πˆn−1,[1t¯] when,
for every t = 1, ..., t¯, ξ[tt¯] ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯−t+1, and st1 ∈ S,
∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t(dst,−1) · vnt(st1, χ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯])
≥
∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t(dst,−1) · vnt(st1, ξ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯])− ǫ.
(27)
That is, action plan χ[1t¯] will be an ǫ-Markov equilibrium in the sense of πˆn−1,[1t¯] when under
the plan’s guidance, the average payoff from any period t and player-1 state st1 on cannot be
improved by more than ǫ through any unilateral deviation, where the “average” is based on
other players’ multi-state st,−1 being sampled from the distribution πˆn−1,t. Note (27) differs
from (23) also in that its unilateral deviation need not be one-time.
6.3 Main Transient Result
Before moving on, we need the single-period payoff functions f˜t to be continuous.
Assumption 2 Each payoff function f˜t(s, x, τ) is continuous in the in-action environment
τ at an (s, x)-independent rate. That is, for any τ ∈ P(S × X) and ǫ > 0, there is δ > 0,
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such that for any τ ′ ∈ P(S ×X) satisfying ρS×X(τ, τ
′) < δ and any (s, x) ∈ S ×X,
| f˜t(s, x, τ)− f˜t(s, x, τ
′) |< ǫ.
Now we show the convergence of finite-game value functions to their NG counterpart, the
proof of which is quite technical as well, and calls upon parts (i) and (iii) of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 For any t = 1, 2, ..., t¯+ 1, let σt ∈ P(S) and πˆn−1,t ∈ P(S
n−1) for each n ∈
N. Suppose the sequence πˆn−1,t asymptotically resembles the sequence σ
n−1
t . Then for any
χ[tt¯] ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯−t+1, the sequence
∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t(dst,−1) · vnt(st1, ξ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯]) will converge
to vt(st1, ξ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯]) at a rate that is independent of both st1 ∈ S and ξ[tt¯] ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯−t+1.
Combining (23) and (27), as well as Proposition 2, we can come to the main result.
Theorem 2 For some σ1 ∈ P(S), suppose χ[1t¯] = (χt | t = 1, 2, ..., t¯) ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯ is a
Markov equilibrium of NG Γ(σ1). Also, suppose πˆn−1,[1t¯] = (πˆn−1,t|t = 1, 2, ..., t¯) ∈ (P(S
n−1))t¯
is such that the sequence πˆn−1,t asymptotically resembles the sequence σ
n−1
t for each t, where
σt = T[1,t−1](χ[1,t−1]) ◦ σ1. Then, for ǫ > 0 and large enough n ∈ N, the given χ[1t¯] is also an
ǫ-Markov equilibrium for the game family (Γn(s1) | s1 ∈ S
n) in the sense of πˆn−1,[1t¯].
The theorem says that players in a large finite game can agree on an NG equilibrium and
expect to lose little on average, as long as the other-player multi-state distribution πˆn−1,t on
which “average” is based is similar to the product form σ n−1t , where σt = T[1,t−1](χ[1,t−1])◦σ1
is the corresponding NG’s predictable equilibrium state distribution for the same period. As
to whether reasonable πˆn−1,[1t¯] = (πˆn−1,t|t = 1, 2, ..., t¯) exists to satisfy this condition, the
answer is affirmative. The next section is dedicated to this point.
7 The Condition in Theorem 2
We now present examples where the key condition in Theorem 2 can be true. In all of them,
we let the initial other-player multi-state distribution πˆn−1,1 = σ
n−1
1 = σ
n
1 |Sn−1. That is, we
let players’ initial states in n-player games be randomly drawn from the NG’s initial state
distribution σ1. Now we discuss what can happen in periods t = 2, 3, ..., t¯.
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7.1 Two Possibilities
First, we can let each πˆn−1,t = σ
n−1
t . It has been discussed right after Definition 1 that
the sequence σ n−1t asymptotically resembles itself. So this choice satisfies the condition in
Theorem 2. This would correspond to the case where players in large finite games take the
“lazy” approach of using independent draws on the NG state distribution to assess their
opponents’ states. Note this is reasonable due to the common initial condition for both
types of games and Theorem 1.
Second, we can let each πˆn−1,t = πnt|Sn−1 , where
πnt = σ
n
1 ⊙ Π
t−1
t′=1(χ
n
t′ ⊙ g˜
n
t′ ). (28)
According to (19), πnt stands for players’ multi-state distribution in period t in an n-player
game when their initial states are randomly drawn from the distribution σ1 and then from
period 1 onward players all follow through with the NG equilibrium χ[1t¯]. Since the sequence
σ n1 asymptotically resembles itself, Theorem 1 will ascertain the asymptotic resemblance of
πnt to σ
n
t . Then, Lemma 5 in Appendix A will lead to the asymptotic resemblance of πˆn−1,t
to σ n−1t . So this choice would satisfy Theorem 2’s condition as well. Also, its meaning is
clear—here players in large finite games use precise assessments on what other players’ states
might be had they followed the NG equilibrium all along.
7.2 Refinement and a Third Choice
Note that πˆn−1,t has not countenanced the possibility in which a player involves his own state
st1 in the estimation of the other-player multi-state st,−1. We now show that this is possible
at least when the state space S is finite. In that case, we can upgrade the πˆn−1,t ∈ P(S
n−1) in
Proposition 2 to πˆn−1,t(·) = (πˆn−1,t(st1|·)|st1 ∈ S) ∈ (P(S
n−1))S and obtain the convergence
of
∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t(st1|dst,−1) · vnt(st1, ξ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯]) to vt(st1, ξ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯]) at an st1-independent
rate. This will lead us to the following extended version of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 Suppose σ[1,t¯+1] and χ[1t¯] are all the same as in Theorem 2. Also, suppose
πˆn−1,[1t¯](·) = (πˆn−1,t(st1|·)|t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, st1 ∈ S) ∈ ((P(S
n−1))S)t¯ is such that the sequence
πˆn−1,t(st1|·) asymptotically resembles the sequence σ
n−1
t for each t and st1. Then, for ǫ > 0
and large enough n ∈ N, for every t = 1, ..., t¯, ξ[tt¯] ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯−t+1, and st1 ∈ S,
∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t(st1|dst,−1) · vnt(st1, χ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯])
≥
∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t(st1|dst,−1) · vnt(st1, ξ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯])− ǫ.
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For it to satisfy the condition in Theorem 3, we can still let πˆn−1,[1t¯](·) be the same as in
the aforementioned two examples, in which the newly added st1-dependence is mute. But a
third choice would allow each player a full-fledged Bayesian update on other players’ states.
In this third choice, we still use (28) to define πnt. Then, as long as σt(st1) > 0, we let
πˆn−1,t(st1|·) = πnt,S|Sn−1(st1|·), (29)
the other-player multi-state distribution derivable from πnt when conditioned on the current
player’s state st1; otherwise, we simply let πˆn−1,t = πnt|Sn−1 just as in the second example.
Note the marginal πnt|S is defined by
πnt|S({st1}) = πnt({st1} × S
n−1), ∀st1 ∈ S, (30)
and each conditional distribution πnt,S|Sn−1(st1|·) is defined by
πnt,S|Sn−1(st1|S
′) =
πnt({st1} × S
′)
πnt|S({st1})
=
πnt({st1} × S
′)
πnt({st1} × Sn−1)
, ∀S ′ ∈ B(Sn−1), (31)
when the denominator is strictly positive and an arbitrary value otherwise.
7.3 Symmetry Makes it Work
The lone fact that πnt asymptotically resembles σ
n
t is actually quite far from being able to
dictate the asymptotic resemblance of the thus defined πˆn−1,t(st1|·) to σ
n−1
t . Note that for a
general qn resembling some p
n, Lemma 6 in Appendix A has all but ruled out the convergence
of πn|A to p, let alone the asymptotic resemblance of qn,A|An−1 to p
n−1. Fortunately, πnt still
enjoys the additional feature of being symmetric.
For any n ∈ N, let Ψn be the set of all n-dimensional permutations. That is, each
ψ ∈ Ψn makes (ψ(1), ..., ψ(n)) a permutation of (1, ..., n). For a given ψ ∈ Ψn, let us
suppose ψa = (aψ(1), ..., aψ(n)) for any a = (a1, ..., an) ∈ A
n, and then ψA′ = {ψa|a ∈ A′} for
any A′ ⊆ An. Note that, due to its innately symmetric definition, B(An) is automatically
symmetric in the sense that B(An) = {ψA′|A′ ∈ B(An)} for any ψ ∈ Ψn.
Definition 2 For n ∈ N and separable metric space A, we say qn ∈ P(A
n) symmetric if
qn(A
′) = qn(ψA
′), ∀ψ ∈ Ψn, A
′ ∈ B(An).
We have the much needed result that asymptotic resemblance of qn to p
n does lead to
the convergence of qn|A to p when qn is symmetric. This is in stark contrast with Lemma 6.
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Proposition 3 Let A be a discrete metric space and qn ∈ P(A
n) for every n ∈ N be symmet-
ric. Suppose the sequence qn asymptotically resembles the sequence p
n. Then, the sequence
qn|A will converge to p, namely, limn→+∞ qn|A({a}) = p({a}) for every a ∈ A.
This then results in the resemblance of qn,A|An−1 to p
n−1.
Proposition 4 Let A be a discrete metric space and qn ∈ P(A
n) for every n ∈ N be symmet-
ric. Suppose the sequence qn asymptotically resembles the sequence p
n. Then, the sequence
qn,A|An−1(a|·) will asymptotically resemble the sequence p
n−1 for any a ∈ A with p({a}) > 0.
Note that πn1, being equal to σ
n
1 , is symmetric. As suggested by (28), the operation it
has to go through to arrive to πnt is also symmetric. Hence, πnt is symmetric. Therefore,
by Proposition 3, the marginal probability πnt|S as defined in (30) would converge to the
NG state distribution σt; thus, the conditional distribution πnt,S|Sn−1(st1|·) as defined in (31)
would be well defined when σt(st1) > 0. Then, Proposition 4 can guarantee that πˆn−1,t(st1|·)
as defined in (29) would asymptotically resemble σ n−1t and hence help to facilitate the
condition needed for Theorem 3. The above suggests that, even when players exercise the
most accurate Bayesian updates on other players’ states using their own state information,
they will not discern much regret on average by adhering to the NG equilibrium.
8 A Stationary Situation
Now we study an infinite-horizon model with stationary features. To this end, we keep S
and X , but let there be a discount factor α¯ ∈ [0, 1). There is a payoff function f˜ which meets
the basic measurability and boundedness requirements, so that f˜t = α¯
t−1 · f˜ for t = 1, 2, .....
Let us use f¯ for the bound f¯1 that appeared in (1). In addition, there is a state transition
kernel g˜ ∈ G(S,X), so that g˜t = g˜ for t = 1, 2, .... For χ ∈ K(S,X), denote by T (χ) the
operator on P(S), so that for any σ ∈ P(S),
T (χ) ◦ σ = σ ⊙ χ⊙ g˜(·, ·, σ ⊗ χ). (32)
Thus, state transition has been made stationary by the stationarity of g˜.
Denote the stationary nonatomic game formed from the above S, X , α¯, f˜ , and g˜ by
Γ∞. It helps to first study the corresponding games Γt that terminate in periods t + 1, for
t = 0, 1, .... Now let vt(s, ξ[1t], σ, χ[1t]) be the total expected payoff a player can receive in
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game Γt, when he starts at state s ∈ S in period 1 and adopts action plan ξ[1t] ∈ (K(S,X))
t
from period 1 to t, while all other players form state distribution σ ∈ P(S) in the beginning
and act according to χ[1t] ∈ (K(S,X))
t from period 1 to t. As a terminal condition, we have
v0(s, σ) = 0. Also, for t = 1, 2, ...,
vt(s, ξ[1t], σ, χ[1t]) =
∫
X
ξ1(s|dx) · [f˜(s, x, σ ⊗ χ1)
+α¯ ·
∫
S
g˜(s, x, σ ⊗ χ1|ds
′) · vt−1(s′, ξ[2t], T (χ1) ◦ σ, χ[2t])].
(33)
Using the terminal condition and (33), we can inductively show that
| vt+1(s, ξ[1,t+1], σ, χ[1,t+1])− v
t(s, ξ[1t], σ, χ[1t]) |≤ α¯
t · f¯ . (34)
Given s ∈ S, ξ[1∞] = (ξ1, ξ2, ...) ∈ (K(S,X))
∞, σ ∈ P(S), and χ[1∞] = (χ1, χ2, ...) ∈
(K(S,X))∞, the sequence {vt(s, ξ[1t], σ, χ[1t]) | t = 0, 1, ...} is thus Cauchy and has a limit
point v∞(s, ξ[1∞], σ, χ[1∞]). The latter is the total discounted expected payoff a player can
obtain in the game Γ∞, when he starts at state s and adopts action plan ξ[1∞], while all
other players form initial pre-action environment σ and act according to χ[1∞].
A pre-action environment σ ∈ P(S) is said to be associated with χ ∈ K(S,X) when
σ = T (χ) ◦ σ. (35)
That is, we let environment σ be associated with action plan χ when the former is invariant
under the one-period transition when all players adhere to the latter. For χ ∈ K(S,X), we
use χ∞ to represent the stationary policy profile (χ, χ, ...) ∈ (K(S,X))∞ that players are to
adopt in all periods t = 1, 2, ....
We deem one-time action plan χ ∈ K(S,X) a stationary Markov equilibrium for the
nonatomic game Γ∞, when there exists a σ ∈ P(S) that is associated with the given χ, so
that for every one-time unilateral deviation ξ ∈ K(S,X),
v∞(s, χ∞, σ, χ∞) ≥ v∞(s, (ξ, χ∞), σ, χ∞), ∀s ∈ S. (36)
Therefore, a policy will be considered an equilibrium when it induces an invariant environ-
ment under whose sway the policy turns out to be a best response in the long run.
Now we move on to the n-player game Γ∞n made out of the same S, X , α¯, f˜ , and g˜.
Similarly to the above, we let Γtn be its n-player counterpart that terminates in period t+1.
Now let vtn(s1, ξ[1t], εs−1, χ[1t]) be the total expected payoff player 1 can receive in game Γ
n
t ,
when he starts with state s1 ∈ S and adopts action plan ξ[1t] ∈ (K(S,X))
t from period 1 to t,
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while other players form initial empirical distribution εs−1 = ε(s2,...,sn) ∈ Pn−1(S) and adopt
policy χ[1t] ∈ (K(S,X))
t from 1 to t. As a terminal condition, we have v0n(s1, εs−1) = 0. For
t = 1, 2, ..., it follows that
vtn(s1, ξ[1t], εs−1, χ[1t]) =
∫
X
ξ1(s1|dx1) ·
∫
Xn−1
χ n−11 (s−1|dx−1) · [f˜(s1, x1, εs−1x−1)
+α¯ ·
∫
Sn
g˜n(s, x|ds′) · vt−1n (s
′
1, ξ[2t], εs′−1, χ[2t])].
(37)
Using the terminal condition and (37), we can inductively show that
| vt+1n (s1, ξ[1,t+1], εs−1, χ[1,t+1])− v
t
n(s1, ξ[1t], εs−1, χ[1t]) |≤ α¯
t · f¯ . (38)
Given s1 ∈ S, ξ[1∞] ∈ (K(S,X))
∞, εs−1 ∈ Pn−1(S), and χ[1∞] ∈ (K(S,X))
∞, the sequence
{vnt (s1, ξ[1t], εs−1, χ[1t]) | t = 0, 1, ...} is Cauchy and has a limit point v
∞
n (s1, ξ[1∞], εs−1, χ[1∞]).
The latter is the total discounted expected payoff a player can obtain in Γ∞n , when he starts
at state s and adopts action plan ξ[1∞], while all other players form the initial pre-action
environment εs−1 and act according to χ[1∞].
For the current setting, it should be noted that Assumptions 1 and 2 translate into the
continuity in τ at an (s, x)-independent rate of, respectively, the transition kernel g˜(s, x, τ)
and payoff function f˜(s, x, τ). We now present the main result for the stationary case.
Theorem 4 Suppose χ ∈ K(S,X) is a stationary Markov equilibrium for the stationary
nonatomic game Γ∞. Let πˆn−1 ∈ P(S
n−1) for each n ∈ N \ {1}. Also suppose the sequence
πˆn−1 asymptotically resembles the sequence σ
n−1, where σ is associated with χ in the equi-
librium definitions (35) and (36). Then, χ∞ would be asymptotically equilibrium for games
Γ∞n in an average sense. More specifically, for any ǫ > 0 and large enough n ∈ N,∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1(ds−1) · v
∞
n (s1, χ
∞, εs−1, χ
∞) ≥
∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1(ds−1) · v
∞
n (s1, ξ[1∞], εs−1, χ
∞)− ǫ,
for any s1 ∈ S and ξ[1∞] ∈ (K(S,X))
∞.
Theorem 4 says that, players in a large finite stationary game will not regret much by
adopting a stationary equilibrium for a correspondent stationary nonatomic game. The
regret can be measured in an average sense, so long as the underlying other-player multi-
state distribution πˆn−1 is close to an invariant σ associated with the NG equilibrium. Just
as in Section 7, we can let πˆn−1 = σ
n−1, indicating that players take a “lazy” approach in
assessing other players’ states. We leave discussion of other possibilities to Appendx E.
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9 Implications of Main Results
9.1 Observation, Remembrance, and Coordination
Regarding Theorems 2 and 3, we note the following for t¯-period games. A prominent feature
of an NG equilibrium χ[1t¯] ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯ is its insensitivity, at any period t, to a player’s
personal history (st′ , xt′ |t
′ = 1, 2, ..., t − 1), historical data regarding other players, and the
present information about other players’ states. Independence of the first two factors has
much to do with the Markovian setup of the game—neither f˜t nor g˜t depends on past history.
But the more interesting independence of the latter two factors stems from players’ common
knowledge about the evolution of their environments. The (σt′⊗χt′ |t
′ = 1, 2, ..., t−1) portion
of the history and the present information σt, both about other players, are determinable
by (10) before the game is even played out.
For finite semi-anonymous games, however, information is gradually revealed and its
perfection is not guaranteed. We can define space OS and map o˜S : P(S)→ OS to represent
a player’s observatory power over his present pre-action environment immediately before
actual play. Similarly, we can define space OSX and map o˜SX : P(S × X) → OSX to
represent his observatory power over the in-action environment just experienced. So that
new information does not contradict old information and no information gets lost, we suppose
function o˜ SXS : OSX → OS exists, with o˜
SX
S (o˜SX(τ)) = o˜S(τ |S) for any τ ∈ P(S ×X).
With these definitions, a player’s decision in period t can be denoted by a map χˆt :
(S ×X ×OSX)
t−1×OS × S → P(X). In the period, player 1’s random decision rule can be
written as χˆt(h˜t, o˜S(εst,−1), st1|·), where the history h˜t is expressible as
h˜t = (st′1, xt′1, o˜SX(εst′,−1xt′,−1)|t
′ = 1, 2, ..., t− 1), (39)
o˜S(εst,−1) is his observation of other players’ status, and st1 represents the player’s own state.
There is a whole spectrum in which OS and o˜S can reside. When OS = {0} and o˜S(·) = 0,
players are ignorant of others’ states; when OS = P(S) and o˜S is the identity map, every
player is fully aware of his surrounding. Similarly, there are varieties of OSX, o˜SX , and o˜
SX
S .
Theorems 2 and 3, however, nullify the need to delve into the (OS, o˜S, OSX , o˜SX, o˜
SX
S )-
related details about finite games. They state that an equilibrium of the NG counterpart,
which is necessarily both oblivious of the past history h˜t and blind to the present obser-
vation o˜S(εst,−1), serves as a good approximate equilibrium for games with enough players.
The absence of h˜t again has a Markovian explanation. On the other hand, the ability to
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shake off o˜S(εst,−1)’s influence is very important, since this saves players the efforts to gather
information about their surroundings.
Regarding Theorem 4, we note the following. Each of our finite stationary games is a
discounted stochastic game. For an n-player version of the latter game in which players have
full knowledge of others’ states, equilibria are hard to compute and for their implementation,
require high degrees of coordination among players; see Solan [30]. These equilibria come
from the space (2R
n
)S
n
× ((Rn)X
n×Sn)S
n×Rn ; whereas, our NG equilibria come from RS×X .
Meanwhile, the discounted stochastic game one faces in real life is often semi-anonymous;
see, e.g., examples listed in Jovanoic and Rosenthal [16]. For such a game, Theorem 4 has
shown that a much easier path can be taken in order to coordinate player behavior under
an ǫ-sized compromise. If players all agree to exercise a corresponding NG equilibrium, the
typical player 1 has only to respond to his own state st1 without giving up too much.
9.2 Sources of NG Equilibria
To further buttress the claim that studying the idealistic NGs can help with the under-
standing and execution of messier finite games faced in real life, we demonstrate that NG
equilibria, meeting criteria (23) and (24) for the transient case and (35) and (36) for the
stationary case, can be obtained relatively easily.
First, we concentrate on the transient case studied in Sections 3 to 6. From (22),
vt(st, (ξt, χ[t+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯]) =
∫
X
ξt(dy) · vt(st, (δy, χ[t+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯]). (40)
Hence,
sup
ξt∈K(S,X)
vt(st, (ξt, χ[t+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯]) = sup
y∈X
vt(st, (δy, χ[t+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯]). (41)
So the equilibrium criterion (23) conveniently used by us for the t¯-period case is equivalent
to, for every t = 1, 2, ..., t¯,
χt(st|X˜t(st, σt, χ[tt¯])) = 1, ∀st ∈ S, (42)
where
X˜t(st, σt, χ[tt¯]) = {x ∈ X|vt(st, (δx, χ[t+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯]) = sup
y∈X
vt(st, (δy, χ[t+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯])}, (43)
and σt is defined through (24).
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The form consisting of (42) and (43) is fairly close to the distributional-equilibrium con-
cept used in NG literature, such as Mas-Colell [24] and Jovanovic and Rosenthal [16]. A
distributional equilibrium is an in-action environment sequence τ[1t¯] = (τt|t = 1, 2, ..., t¯) ∈
(P(S ×X))t¯ which satisfies τt(U˜t(τ[tt¯])) = 1 for each t = 1, 2, ..., t¯. Here, U˜t(τ[tt¯]) = {(s, x) ∈
S×X|v′t(s, x, τ[tt¯]) = supy∈X v
′
t(s, y, τ[tt¯])}, and v
′
t(s, y, τ[tt¯]) is a player’s payoff when he starts
period t with state s and action y, but other players in all periods and he himself in later
periods act according to τ[tt¯]; corresponding to (24), the distributional equilibrium also sat-
isfies τ1|S = σ1 and τt|S = τt−1 ⊙ g˜t−1(·, ·, τt−1) for t = 2, 3, ..., t¯. According to Jovanovic
and Rosenthal [16] (Theorem 1), such an equilibrium τ[1t¯] would exist when S and X are
compact, each payoff f˜t is bounded and continuous in all arguments, and each transition
kernel g˜t is continuous in all arguments.
When an equilibrium χ[1t¯] in our conditional sense exists, we can construct a distributional
equilibrium τ[1t¯] by resorting iteratively to τt = σt⊗χt and σt+1 = Tt(χt)◦σt for t = 1, 2, ..., t¯.
Conversely, when the latter distributional equilibrium τ[1t¯] is available, we can nearly get a
conditional equilibrium χ[1t¯] back. For each t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, according to Duffie, Geanakoplos,
Mas-Colell, and McLennan [9] (p. 751), we can identify a χt ∈ K(S,X), which also passes
as a measurable map from S to P(X), that satisfies τt = τt|S ⊗ χt. Thus, we will be able to
construct χ[1t¯] consecutively from χ1 up to χt¯. But even then, χ[tt¯] along with σt = τt|S would
satisfy (42) only for τt|S-almost every st, but not necessarily every st ∈ S. For instance, we
can suppose S = {s¯1, s¯2, ...}. At each t, the constructed χ[1t¯] could guarantee (42) for those
s¯i’s with (τt|S)(s¯i) > 0 but not those with (τt|S)(s¯i) = 0. On the other hand, a conditional
equilibrium χ[1t¯] can be obtained directly; see Appendix F.1 for details.
When it comes to the stationary case examined in Section 8, we make parallel develop-
ments. Here the property corresponding to (36) is
χ(s|X˜∞(s, σ, χ)) = 1, ∀s ∈ S, (44)
where
X˜∞(s, σ, χ) = {x ∈ X|v
∞(s, (δx, χ
∞), σ, χ∞) = sup
y∈X
v∞(s, (δy, χ
∞), σ, χ∞)}, (45)
and σ satisfies (35). Again, the existence of a related distributional equilibrium τ ∈ P(S×X)
is known under quite general conditions; see, e.g., Jovanovic and Rosenthal [16] (Theorem
2). However, an equilibrium τ does not exactly lead to a conditional equilibrium χ. So once
more we focus on a direct approach for the stationary case; see Appendix F.2.
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10 Concluding Remarks
Under a common action plan, we have shown that environments faced by players in multi-
period large finite games would stay close to those of their NG counterparts. For transient
and stationary settings, our results reveal that an NG equilibrium, necessarily both oblivious
of past history and blind to present status of other players, could serve as a good approximate
equilibrium in large finite games. We reckon that the discreteness requirement on both the
state and action spaces can be frustrating in some circumstances. Besides the relaxation of
the aforementioned restriction, future research can also look into the issue of converge rate.
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Appendices
A Concepts and Rudimentary Lemmas
Recall that ρA stands for the Prohorov metric for the space of distributions P(A).
Lemma 1 Let A be a separable metric space. Then, for any n ∈ N and a, a′ ∈ An,
ρA(εa, εa′) ≤
n
max
m=1
dA(am, a
′
m).
Proof: Let ǫ = maxnm=1 dA(am, a
′
m). For any A
′ ∈ B(A), the key observation is that
δa′m((A
′)ǫ) ≥ δam(A
′). (A.1)
Then,
εa′((A
′)ǫ) =
∑n
m=1 δa′m((A
′)ǫ)
n
≥
∑n
m=1 δam(A
′)
n
= εa(A
′). (A.2)
Thus, ρA(εa, εa′) ≤ ǫ.
25
According to Parthasarathy [26] (Theorem II.7.1), the strong law of large numbers applies
to the empirical distribution under the weak topology, and hence under the Prohorov metric.
In the following, we state its weak version.
Lemma 2 Let separable metric space A and distribution p ∈ P(A) be given. Then, for any
ǫ > 0, as long as n is large enough,
pn({a ∈ An | ρA(εa, p) < ǫ}) > 1− ǫ.
Due to the inequality of Dvoretzky, Kiefer, and Wolfolwitz [10], the above convergence
is uniform for certain A’s. The inequality infers that, when A is R or countable,
pn({a ∈ An | ρA(εa, p) ≤ ǫ}) > 1− 2e
−2nǫ2 , ∀ǫ > 0.
When n is greater than ln(3/ǫ)/(2ǫ2), a number independent of p ∈ P(A), the above would
entail the inequality in Lemma 2. Thus, we have the following.
Lemma 3 When A is the real line R or countable, the convergence expressed in Lemma 2
is uniform. Namely, a lower bound could be identified so that every n above it would realize
the inequality in the lemma for every p ∈ P(A).
For separable metric space A, point a ∈ A, and the (n− 1)-point empirical distribution
p ∈ Pn−1(A), we use (a, p)n to represent the member of Pn(A) that has an additional 1/n
weight on the point a, but with probability masses in p being reduced to (n− 1)/n times of
their original values. For a ∈ An and m = 1, ..., n, we have (am, εa−m)n = εa. Concerning
the Prohorov metric, we have also a simple but useful observation.
Lemma 4 Let A be a separable metric space. Then, for any n ∈ N \ {1}, a ∈ A, and
p ∈ Pn−1(A),
ρA((a, p)n, p) ≤
1
n
.
Proof: Let A′ ∈ B(A) be chosen. Then p(A′) = (m− 1)/(n− 1) for some m = 1, 2, ..., n. If
a /∈ A′, then (a, p)n(A
′) = (m− 1)/n and hence
(a, p)n(A
′) ≤ p(A′) ≤ (a, p)n(A
′) +
1
n
. (A.3)
If a ∈ A′, then (a, p)n(A
′) = m/n and hence
(a, p)n(A
′)−
1
n
≤ p(A′) ≤ (a, p)n(A
′). (A.4)
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Therefore, it is always true that
| (a, p)n(A
′)− p(A′) |≤
1
n
. (A.5)
Due to the nature of the Prohorov metric, we have
ρA((a, p)n, p) ≤
1
n
. (A.6)
We have thus completed the proof.
For the notion of asymptotic resemblance introduced in Definition 1, we have that it is
preserved under certain projections and expansions.
Lemma 5 Let A be a separable metric space. Also, qn ∈ P(A
n) for every n ∈ N and
p ∈ P(A). Suppose the sequence qn asymptotically resembles the sequence p
n. Then, the
sequence qn|An−1 will asymptotically resemble the sequence p
n−1.
Proof: For any ǫ > 0, due to the asymptotic resemblance of the sequence qn to the sequence
pn, we have, for n large enough,
qn(A
′
n) > 1− ǫ, (A.7)
where
A′n = {a ∈ A
n|ρA(εa, p) < ǫ}. (A.8)
By Lemma 4, we have
ρA(εa, εa−1) ≤
1
n
, ∀a ∈ An. (A.9)
Hence, for large enough n,
A′n ⊆ A×A
′′
n−1, (A.10)
where
A′′n−1 = {a−1 ∈ A
n−1|ρA(εa−1, p) < 2ǫ}. (A.11)
But by (A.7), this means that
(qn|An−1)(A
′′
n−1) = qn(A×A
′′
n−1) ≥ qn(A
′
n) > 1− ǫ. (A.12)
That is, qn|An−1 asymptotically resembles p
n−1.
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Lemma 6 Let A be a separable metric space. Also, qn ∈ P(A
n) for every n ∈ N and
p, p′ ∈ P(A). Suppose the sequence qn asymptotically resembles the sequence p
n. Then, the
sequence p′ × qn−1 will asymptotically resemble the sequence p
n as well.
Proof: For any ǫ > 0, due to the asymptotic resemblance of the sequence qn to the sequence
pn, we have, for n large enough,
qn−1(A
′
n−1) > 1− ǫ, (A.13)
where
A′n−1 = {a ∈ A
n−1|ρA(εa, p) < ǫ}. (A.14)
By Lemma 4, we have
ρA(ε(a1,a), εa) ≤
1
n
, ∀a1 ∈ A, a ∈ A
n−1. (A.15)
Hence, for large enough n,
A×A′n−1 ⊆ A
′′
n, (A.16)
where
A′′n = {a ∈ A
n|ρA(εa, p) < 2ǫ}. (A.17)
But by (A.13), this means that
(p′ × qn−1)(A
′′
n) ≥ (p
′ × qn−1)(A× A
′
n−1) = p
′(A)× qn−1(A
′
n−1) > 1− ǫ. (A.18)
That is, p′ × qn−1 asymptotically resembles p
n.
Lemma 7 Let A and B be separable metric spaces. Also, qn ∈ P(A
n×Bn) for every n ∈ N
and p ∈ P(A×B). Suppose the sequence qn asymptotically resembles the sequence p
n. Then,
the sequence qn|An will asymptotically resemble the sequence (p|A)
n.
Proof: For any ǫ > 0, due to the asymptotic resemblance of the sequence qn to the sequence
pn, we have, for n large enough,
qn(C
′
n) > 1− ǫ, (A.19)
where
C ′n = {c = (a, b) ∈ A
n × Bn|ρA×B(εc, p) < ǫ}. (A.20)
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But by (87) of Yang [33],
ρA(εa, p|A) = ρA(εc|A, p|A) ≤ ρA×B(εc, p), ∀c = (a, b) ∈ C
′
n. (A.21)
Hence,
C ′n ⊆ A
′
n ×B
n, (A.22)
where
A′n = {a ∈ A
n|ρA(εa, p|A) < ǫ}. (A.23)
Combining (A.19) and (A.22), we can obtain
(qn|An)(A
′
n) = qn(A
′
n ×B
n) ≥ qn(C
′
n) > 1− ǫ. (A.24)
This indicates that qn|An asymptotically resembles (p|A)
n.
B Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Proposition 1: We first prove (i). Fix some ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Due to the countability
of S , we can identify some I of its points s¯1, s¯2, ..., s¯I , so that each σ({s¯i}) > 0 and
I∑
i=1
σ({s¯i}) > 1− ǫ. (B.1)
For convenience, let S¯ ′ = {s¯1, s¯2, ..., s¯I} and S¯
′′ = S \ S¯ ′.
Since S is discrete, the distance dS(S¯
′, S¯ ′′) = infs′∈S¯′,s′′∈S¯′′ dS(s
′, s′′) > 0. For i, j =
1, 2, ..., I, let us use dij for dS(s¯i, s¯j) and σi for σ({s¯i}). Now define
δ =
ǫ
I
∧ dS(S¯
′, S¯ ′′) ∧ (min
i 6=j
dij) ∧ (min
i
σi
2
), (B.2)
which is still strictly positive. In this paper, we use a∧ b to stand for min{a, b} and a∨ b to
stand for max{a, b}.
For any n ∈ N, define S ′n ∈ B(S
n) so that
S ′n = {s ∈ S
n|ρS(εs, σ) < δ}. (B.3)
By the hypothesis that πn asymptotically resembles σ
n, we can ensure
πn(S
′
n) > 1−
ǫ
2
, (B.4)
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by making n large enough.
Consider any such n, as well as any s = (s1, s2, ..., sn) ∈ S
′
n and i = 1, 2, ..., I. It follows
from δ ≤ dS(S¯
′, S¯ ′′) ∧ (mini 6=j dij) that ({s¯i})
δ, whose meaning comes from (??), is still {s¯i}
itself. Now by (B.3),
εs({s¯i}) < σ(({s¯i})
δ) + δ = σi + δ, (B.5)
and
εs({s¯i}) = 1− εs({s¯j |j 6= i} ∪ S¯
′′) > 1− σ(({s¯j|j 6= i} ∪ S¯
′′)δ)− δ
= 1− σ({s¯j |j 6= i} ∪ S¯
′′)− δ = σi − δ,
(B.6)
which is still above δ > 0 by the fact that δ ≤ mini σi/2. For convenience, let ni(s) =
n · εs({s¯i}), the number of components sm of s that happen to be s¯i. Now we know that
ni(s) is above nδ for every s ∈ S
′
n and i = 1, 2, ..., I.
On the other hand, by Lemma 2, there exists some ni for each i = 1, 2, ..., I, so that when
ni > ni,
(χ(s¯i))
ni(X ′ini) > 1−
ǫ
2I
, (B.7)
where
X ′ini = {x ∈ X
ni|ρX(εx, χ(s¯i)) < δ}. (B.8)
Since δ > 0, we can ensure that nδ and hence ni(s) is above ni for every i = 1, 2, ..., I by
letting n be large enough.
Fix a big n that facilitates both (B.4) and (B.7). For any (s, x) ∈ Sn ×Xn, let x˜i(s, x)
be the ni(s)-long vector of xm’s whose corresponding sm’s happen to be s¯i:
x˜i(s, x) = (xm|m = 1, 2, ..., n but with sm = s¯i) ∈ X
ni(s). (B.9)
Define U ′n ∈ B(S
n ×Xn), so that
U ′n = {(s, x) ∈ S
n ×Xn|s ∈ S ′n and x˜i(s, x) ∈ X
′
ini(s)
for each i = 1, 2, ..., I}. (B.10)
By (16), (B.4), and (B.7), we have
(πn ⊗ χ
n)(U ′n) =
∫
S′n
πn(ds) ·
I∏
i=1
(χ(s¯i))
ni(s)(X ′ini(s)) > (1−
ǫ
2
) · (1−
ǫ
2I
)I > 1− ǫ. (B.11)
For any (s, x) in U ′n, let us examine how close εsx = ε((s1,x1),...,(sn,xn)) is to σ ⊗ χ. Recall
that S = {s¯1, s¯2, ..., s¯I} ∪ S¯
′′. So for any U ′ ∈ B(S ×X),
U ′ = (
I⋃
i=1
{s¯i} ×X
′
i)
⋃
U ′′, (B.12)
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where X ′i ∈ B(X) for i = 1, 2, ..., I, while U
′′ is such that s′′ ∈ S¯ ′′ for any (s′′, x′′) ∈ U ′′. Note
again that δ ≤ dS(S¯
′, S¯ ′′)∧mini 6=j dij. When we take dS×X to mean dS×X((s
′, x′), (s′′, x′′)) =
dS(s
′, s′′) ∨ dX(x
′, x′′), (B.12) would lead to
I⋃
i=1
{s¯i} × (X
′
i)
δ ⊆ (U ′)δ. (B.13)
Now from (B.5) and (B.8),
εsx({s¯i} ×X
′
i) = εs({s¯i}) · εx˜i(s,x)(X
′
i) < (σi + δ) · [χ(s¯i|(X
′
i)
δ) + δ]
≤ (σ ⊗ χ)({s¯i} × (X
′
i)
δ) + 2δ + δ2 < (σ ⊗ χ)({s¯i} × (X
′
i)
δ) + 3δ,
(B.14)
where the last inequality is due to our choice that δ ≤ ǫ/I < 1. Meanwhile,
εsx(U
′′) ≤ εsx(S¯
′′ ×X) = εs(S¯
′′) = 1−
I∑
i=1
εs({s¯i}) < 1−
I∑
i=1
σi + Iδ < ǫ+ Iδ, (B.15)
where the second-to-last inequality is due to (B.6) and the last one is due to (B.1). Com-
bine (B.12) to (B.15), and we can obtain
εsx(U
′) < (σ ⊗ χ)((U ′)δ) + ǫ+ 4Iδ. (B.16)
Thus,
ρS×X(εsx, σ ⊗ χ) < ǫ+ 4Iδ ≤ 5ǫ, (B.17)
where the last inequality comes from our choice that δ ≤ ǫ/I. Since (B.11) and (B.17) are
to occur at any n that is large enough, we see that (i) is true.
We then prove (ii). For convenience, we denote S × X by U , σ ⊗ χ by τ , and for each
n ∈ N, πn ⊗ χ
n by νn. From (i), we have the sequence νn asymptotically resembling the
sequence τn.
Fix some ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Due to the countability of S and X , and hence that of U , we can
identify some J points u¯1, u¯2, ..., u¯J , so that each τ({u¯j}) > 0 and
J∑
j=1
τ({u¯j}) > 1− ǫ. (B.18)
For convenience, let U¯ ′ = {u¯1, u¯2, ..., u¯J} and U¯
′′ = U \ U¯ ′.
As S and X are both discrete, so U is discrete as well. Thence, the distance dU(U¯
′, U¯ ′′) =
infu′∈U¯ ′,u′′∈U¯ ′′ dU(u
′, u′′) > 0. For j, k = 1, 2, ..., J , let us use d′jk for dU(u¯j, u¯k) and τj for
τ({u¯j}). Now define
δ =
ǫ
J
∧ dU(U¯
′, U¯ ′′) ∧ (min
j 6=k
d′jk) ∧ (min
j
τj
2
), (B.19)
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which is still strictly positive.
For any n ∈ N, define U ′n ∈ B(U
n) so that
U ′n = {u ∈ U
n|ρU(εu, τ)
∨
[2 · sup
u′∈U
n
max
m=1
ρS(g(u
′, εu−m), g(u
′, τ))] < δ}. (B.20)
By (i) that νn asymptotically resembles τ
n, the hypothesis that g(u, ·) is continuous at a
u-independent rate, and Lemma 4, we can ensure
νn(U
′
n) > 1−
ǫ
2
, (B.21)
by making n large enough,
Consider any such n, as well as any u = (u1, u2, ..., un) ∈ U
′
n and j = 1, 2, ..., J . It follows
from δ ≤ dU(U¯
′, U¯ ′′) ∧ (minj 6=k d
′
jk) that ({u¯j})
δ is still {u¯j} itself. Now by (B.20),
εu({u¯j}) < τ(({u¯j})
δ) + δ = τj + δ, (B.22)
and
εu({u¯j}) > 1− τ(({u¯k|k 6= j} ∪ U¯
′′)δ)− δ = τj − δ, (B.23)
which is still above δ > 0 by the fact that δ ≤ minj τj/2. For convenience, let n
′
j(u) =
n · εu({u¯j}). Now we know that n
′
j(u) is above ⌊nδ⌋ for every j = 1, 2, ..., J .
Due to the countability of U and Lemma 3 on the uniform Glivenko-Cantelli property,
there exists some n′, independent of both j and u, such that when every n′j(u) > n
′,
(g(u¯j, εu\u¯j))
n′j(u)(S ′′jn′j(u)(u)) > 1−
ǫ
2J
, ∀j = 1, 2, ..., J, (B.24)
where every u \ u¯j is the (n − 1)-long vector that is almost identical to u but with only
n′j(u)− 1 components equal to u¯j, and
S ′′jn′(u
′) = {s ∈ Sn
′
|ρS(εs, g(u¯j, εu′\u¯j )) <
δ
2
}. (B.25)
But in light of (B.20), we can really guarantee that
(g(u¯j, εu\u¯j))
n′j(u)(S ′jn′j(u)) > 1−
ǫ
2J
, ∀j = 1, 2, ..., J, (B.26)
where
S ′jn′ = {s ∈ S
n′|ρS(εs, g(u¯j, τ)) < δ}. (B.27)
Since δ > 0, we can ensure that ⌊nδ⌋ and hence n′j(u) is above n
′ for every j = 1, 2, ..., J by
letting n be large enough.
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Fix a big n that facilitates both (B.21) and (B.26). For any (u, s) ∈ Un× Sn, let s˜j(u, s)
be the n′j(u)-long vector of sm’s whose corresponding um’s happen to be u¯j:
s˜j(u, s) = (sm|m = 1, 2, ..., n but with um = u¯j) ∈ S
n′j(u). (B.28)
Define V ′n ∈ B(U
n × Sn), so that
V ′n = {(u, s) ∈ U
n × Sn|u ∈ U ′n and s˜j(u, s) ∈ S
′
jn′
j
(u) for each j = 1, 2, ..., J}. (B.29)
Let us follow the same logic as used from (B.11) to (B.17) in the proof of (i), with
appropriate substitutions, such as J for I, U for S, S for X , νn for πn, τ for σ, g(·, ·, τ) for
χ, gn for χn, V ′n for U
′
n, (B.21) for (B.4), and (B.26) for (B.7). We can then derive that
(νn ⊗ g
n)(V ′n) > 1− ǫ, (B.30)
whereas, for any (u, s) in V ′n,
ρU×S(εus, τ ⊗ g(·, ·, τ)) < 5ǫ. (B.31)
Since (B.30) and (B.31) are to occur at any n that is large enough, we see that νn ⊗ g
n
would asymptotically resemble (τ ⊗ g(·, ·, τ))n. Lemma 7 will then lead to the asymptotic
resemblance of the sequence νn ⊙ g
n = (νn ⊗ g
n)|Sn to the sequence (τ ⊙ g(·, ·, τ))
n =
((τ ⊗ g(·, ·, τ))|S)
n. Thus (ii) is true.
For (iii), denote the given (s, x) by u1. By Lemma 4, we can make εu = (u1, εu−1)n
arbitrarily close to εu−1 for any u−1 = (u2, u3, ..., un) ∈ U
n−1 by letting n be large enough.
Hence, we can follow the proof of (ii) almost verbatim, with its (B.20) replaced by
U ′n−1 = {u−1 ∈ U
n−1|ρU(εu, τ)
∨
[2 · sup
u′∈U
n
max
m=1
ρS(g(u
′, εu−m), g(u
′, τ))] < δ}, (B.32)
its (B.21) replaced by
(δu1 × νn−1)({u1} × U
′
n−1) = νn−1(U
′
n−1) > 1−
ǫ
2
, (B.33)
any choice of u ∈ Un replaced by u−1 ∈ U
n−1, and any choice of u ∈ U ′n replaced by
u−1 ∈ U
′
n−1.
Proof of Theorem 1: We prove by induction on t′.
First, note that T[t,t−1] ◦ σt is merely σt itself. Hence, the claim is true for t
′ = t because
by the hypothesis, we do have πnt asymptotically resembling (T[t,t−1] ◦ σt)
n = σ nt . Then,
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for some t′ = t, t + 1, ..., t¯, suppose the claim is true, that πnt′ = πnt ⊙ Π
t′−1
t′′=t(χ
n
t′′ ⊙ g˜
n
t′′)
asymptotically resembles σ nt′ = (T[t,t′−1](χ[t,t′−1]) ◦ σt)
n.
Assumption 1 on g˜t′(s, x, τ)’s equi-continuity in τ allows us to use part (ii) of Propo-
sition 1. By it, we would have πnt′ ⊙ χ
n
t′ ⊙ g˜
n
t′ asymptotically resembling (σt′ ⊙ χt′ ⊙
g˜t(·, ·, σt′ ⊗ χt′))
n. Since the former is merely πn,t′+1 = πnt ⊙ Π
t′
t′′=t(χ
n
t′′ ⊙ g˜
n
t′′) and the latter
is σ nt′+1 = (T[tt′](χ[tt′]) ◦ σt)
n, we have thus proved the claim for t′ + 1.
The induction process is now complete.
C Proofs of Section 6
Proof of Proposition 2: Let us prove by induction on t. By (21) and (25), the desired
result is true for t = t¯+ 1.
At some t = t¯, t¯−1, ..., 1, suppose for any σt+1 and any sequence πˆn−1,t+1 that asymptoti-
cally resembles σn−1t+1 , the sequence
∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t+1(dst+1,−1)·vn,t+1(st+1,1, ξ[t+1,t¯], , εst+1,−1, χ[t+1,t¯])
converges to vt+1(st+1,1, ξ[t+1,t¯], σt+1, χ[t+1,t¯]) at a rate independent of both st+1,1 and ξ[t+1,t¯].
Now, given the sequence πˆn−1,t that is known to asymptotically resemble σ
n−1
t , we are
to show that
∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t(dst,−1) · vnt(st1, ξ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯]) will converge to vt(st1, ξ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯])
at a rate independent of both st1 and ξ[tt¯]. For convenience, let σt+1 = Tt(χt) ◦ σt.
Note that, by (22) and (26),
supst1∈S,ξ[tt¯]∈(K(S,X))t¯−t+1 | vt(st1, ξ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯])
−
∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t(dst,−1) · vnt(st1, ξ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯]) |≤Mn1 +Mn2 +Mn3,
(C.1)
where
Mn1 = sup(st1,xt1)∈S×X
∫
Sn−1×Xn−1
(πˆn−1,t ⊗ χ
n−1
t )(dst,−1 × dxt,−1)×
× | f˜t(st1, xt1, σt ⊗ χt)− f˜t(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1) |,
(C.2)
Mn2 = sup(st1,xt1)∈S×X,ξ[t+1,t¯]∈(K(S,X))t¯−t
∫
S
g˜t(st1, xt1, σt ⊗ χt|dst+1,1)×
× | vt+1(st+1,1, ξ[t+1,t¯], σt+1, χ[t+1,t¯])−
∫
Sn−1×Xn−1
(πˆn−1,t ⊗ χ
n−1
t )(dst,−1 × dxt,−1)×
×Πnm=2
∫
S
g˜t(stm, xtm, εst,−mxt,−m|dst+1,m) · vn,t+1(st+1,1, ξ[t+1,t¯], εst+1,−1, χ[t+1,t¯]) |,
(C.3)
and
Mn3 = sup(st1,xt1)∈S×X,ξ[t+1,t¯]∈(K(S,X))t¯−t
∫
Sn−1×Xn−1
(πˆn−1,t ⊗ χ
n−1
t )(dst,−1 × dxt,−1)×
× | [
∫
S
g˜t(st1, xt1, σt ⊗ χt|dst+1,1)−
∫
S
g˜t(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1 |dst+1,1)]×
×Πnm=2
∫
S
g˜t(stm, xtm, εst,−mxt,−m|dst+1,m) · vn,t+1(st+1,1, ξ[t+1,t¯], εst+1,−1, χ[t+1,t¯]) | .
(C.4)
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We now show that each of the above three terms can be made arbitrarily small by letting n
be large enough.
For Mn1, define U˜n−1(δ) ∈ B(S
n−1 ×Xn−1) for every δ > 0, so that
U˜n−1(δ) = {(st,−1, xt,−1) ∈ S
n−1 ×Xn−1|ρS×X(εst,−1xt,−1, σt ⊗ χt) < δ}. (C.5)
From (C.2), we know Mn1 ≤ Mn11(δ) +Mn12(δ) for any δ > 0, where
Mn11(δ) = sup
(st1,xt1)∈S×X,(st,−1,xt,−1)∈U˜n−1(δ)
| f˜t(st1, xt1, σt ⊗ χt)− f˜t(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1) |, (C.6)
and
Mn12(δ) = sup(st1,xt1)∈S×X
∫
(Sn−1×Xn−1)\U˜n−1(δ)
(πˆn−1,t ⊗ χ
n−1
t )(dst,−1 × dxt,−1)×
×[| f˜t(st1, xt1, σt ⊗ χt) | + | f˜t(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1) |].
(C.7)
Because Assumption 2 says that f˜t(s, x, τ) is continuous in τ at an (s, x)-independent rate,
we can make Mn11(δ) arbitrarily small by letting δ be small enough. Meanwhile, by the
asymptotic resemblance of the sequence πˆn−1,t to the sequence σ
n−1
t and part (i) of Propo-
sition 1, we know that the sequence πˆn−1,t ⊗ χ
n−1
t asymptotically resembles the sequence
(σt⊗χt)
n−1. So the measure (πˆn−1,t⊗χ
n−1
t )((S
n−1×Xn−1)\U˜n−1(δ)) can be made arbitrarily
small at any δ by letting n be large enough. Since f˜t is bounded, this means that Mn12(δ)
can be made arbitrarily small as well.
ForMn2, note the second integral in (C.3) can be understood as πˆn−1,t+1(st1, xt1|dst+1,−1) =∫
Sn−1
{[(δst1xt1 × (σ
n−1
t ⊗ χ
n−1
t ))⊙ g˜
n
t ]|Sn−1}(dst+1,−1). So we have
Mn2 ≤ sup(st1,xt1)∈S×X,st+1,1∈S,ξ[t+1,t¯]∈(K(S,X))t¯−t | vt+1(st+1,1, ξ[t+1,t¯], σt+1, χ[t+1,t¯])
−
∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t+1(st1, xt1|dst+1,−1) · vn,t+1(st+1,1, ξ[t+1,t¯], εst+1,−1, χ[t+1,t¯]) | .
(C.8)
Meanwhile, Assumption 1 allows us to use part (iii) of Proposition 1. By the asymptotic
resemblance of the sequence πˆn−1,t to the sequence σ
n−1
t , part (iii) of Proposition 1, and
Lemma 5, we know that the sequence πˆn−1,t+1(st1, xt1) asymptotically resembles the se-
quence σn−1t+1 at an (st1, xt1)-independent rate. Then by the induction hypothesis where the
convergence rate is also (st+1,1, ξ[t+1,t¯])-independent, we can conclude that Mn2 can be made
arbitrarily small by letting n be large enough.
For Mn3, define Vn(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1, ξ[t+1,t¯]) so that
Vn(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1, ξ[t+1,t¯]) =| [
∫
S
g˜t(st1, xt1, σt ⊗ χt|dst+1,1)
−
∫
S
g˜t(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1|dst+1,1)] · Π
n
m=2g˜t(stm, xtm, εst,−mxt,−m|dst+1,m)×
×vn,t+1(st+1,1, ξ[t+1,t¯], εst+1,−1, χ[t+1,t¯]) | .
(C.9)
35
Then, (C.4) can be written as
Mn3 = sup(st1,xt1)∈S×X,ξ[t+1,t¯]∈(K(S,X))t¯−t
∫
Sn−1×Xn−1
×
×(πˆn−1,t ⊗ χ
n−1
t )(dst,−1 × dxt,−1) · Vn(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1, ξ[t+1,t¯]).
(C.10)
Noting the definition of U˜n−1(δ) in (C.5) for any δ > 0, we see thatMn3 ≤ Mn31(δ)+Mn32(δ),
where
Mn31(δ) = sup(st1,xt1)∈S×X,(st,−1,xt,−1)∈U˜n−1(δ),ξ[t+1,t¯]∈(K(S,X))t¯−t
Vn(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1, ξ[t+1,t¯]),
(C.11)
and
Mn32(δ) = sup(st1,xt1)∈S×X,ξ[t+1,t¯]∈(K(S,X))t¯−t
∫
(st,−1,xt,−1)∈(Sn−1×Xn−1)\U˜n−1(δ)
(πˆn−1,t ⊗ χ
n−1
t )(dst,−1 × dxt,−1) · Vn(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1, ξ[t+1,t¯]).
(C.12)
We argue that Mn31(δ) can be made arbitrarily small as δ approaches 0
+. Due to As-
sumption 1 that g˜t(s, x, τ) is continuous in τ at an (s, x)-independent rate, we can make
g˜t(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1) for any (st,−1, xt,−1) ∈ U˜n−1(δ) arbitrarily close to g˜t(st1, xt1, σt ⊗ χt)
by rendering δ small enough, without respect to (st1, xt1). Due to its countability, we can
write S = {s¯1, s¯2, ...}. Under known st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1, and ξ[t+1,t¯], let us use the simplified
notation
γi = g˜t(st1, xt1, σt ⊗ χt|{s¯i}), (C.13)
γ′i = g˜t(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1|{s¯i}), (C.14)
and
vi = Π
n
m=2
∫
S
g˜t(stm, xtm, εst,−mxt,−m|dst+1,m) · vn,t+1(st+1,1, ξ[t+1,t¯], εst+1,−1, χ[t+1,t¯]). (C.15)
Then, (C.9) can be expressed as
Vn(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1, ξ[t+1,t¯]) =|
∑
i
γi · vi −
∑
i
γ′i · vi | . (C.16)
Note the | vi |’s are uniformly bounded, say by v, due to the boundedness of the f˜t′ ’s and
the finiteness of t¯. Let I be the set of i’s such that γi ≥ γ
′
i. Then, from (C.16), we have
Vn(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1, ξ[t+1,t¯]) ≤ 2v ·
∑
i∈I
(γi − γ
′
i). (C.17)
Let δ be below infs 6=s′ dS(s, s
′) > 0. But then, (st,−1, xt,−1) ∈ U˜n−1(δ) would entail
∑
i∈I(γi − γ
′
i) = g˜t(st1, xt1, σt ⊗ χt|{si|i ∈ I})− g˜t(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1|{si|i ∈ I})
= g˜t(st1, xt1, σt ⊗ χt|{si|i ∈ I})− g˜t(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1|({si|i ∈ I})
δ) < δ.
(C.18)
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In view of (C.17), Vn(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1 , ξ[t+1,t¯]) with (st,−1, xt,−1) ∈ U˜n−1(δ) can be made
arbitrarily small by decreasing δ at a rate independent of (st1, xt1, ξ[t+1,t¯]). In view of (C.11),
we see that Mn31(δ) can be made arbitrarily small by rendering δ small enough.
As noted earlier, the probability (πˆn−1,t ⊗ χ
n−1
t )((S
n−1 ×Xn−1) \ U˜n−1(δ)) can be made
arbitrarily small at any δ when n is made large enough. But since Vn(st1, xt1, εst,−1xt,−1, ξ[t+1,t¯])
is uniformly bounded, this means that Mn12(δ) can be made arbitrarily small as well.
Hence, all three terms can be made arbitrarily small by letting n be large enough. We
have thus completed the induction process.
Proof of Theorem 2: Given (23) for every t = 1, 2, ..., t¯ and ξt ∈ K(S,X), we are to
verify (27) for every t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, ǫ > 0, large enough n, st1 ∈ S, and ξ[tt¯] ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯−t+1.
First, we show that the one-time formulation of (23) would already imply the futility of
any multi-period unilateral deviation. Another way to write the condition is, at t′ = 0, for
any t = 1, 2, ..., t¯− t′ and ξ[t,t+t′] ∈ (K(S,X))
t′+1,
vt(st, (ξ[t,t+t′−1], χ[t+t′,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯]) ≥ vt(st, (ξ[t,t+t′], χ[t+t′+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯]). (C.19)
Now suppose (C.19) is true for some t′ = 0, 1, ..., t¯− 1. We are to show its validity at t′ + 1.
But by (22), for any t = 1, 2, ..., t¯− t′,
vt(st, (ξ[t,t+t′], χ[t+t′+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯])− vt(st, (ξ[t,t+t′+1], χ[t+t′+2,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯])
=
∫
X
ξt(st|dxt) ·
∫
S
g˜t(st, xt, σt ⊗ χt|dst+1)×
×[vt+1(st+1, (ξ[t+1,t+t′], χ[t+t′+1,t¯]), Tt(χt) ◦ σt, χ[t+1,t¯])
−vt+1(st+1, (ξ[t+1,t+t′+1], χ[t+t′+2,t¯]), Tt(χt) ◦ σt, χ[t+1,t¯])],
(C.20)
which, by the induction hypothesis (C.19), is positive. Therefore, (C.19) is true for any
t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, t′ = 0, 1, ..., t¯− t, and ξ[t,t+t′] ∈ (K(S,X))
t′+1.
Using (C.19) multiple times, we can derive, for any t = 1, 2, ..., t¯ and ξ[tt¯] ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯−t+1,
vt(st, χ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯]) ≥ vt(st, (ξt, χ[t+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯]) ≥ vt(st, (ξ[t,t+1], χ[t+2,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯])
≥ · · · ≥ vt(st, (ξ[t,t¯−1], χt¯), σt, χ[tt¯]) ≥ vt(st, ξ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯]).
(C.21)
In view of (C.21), we would have (27) if for any ǫ and large enough n,∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t(dst,−1) · vnt(st1, χ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯]) > vt(st1, χ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯])−
ǫ
2
, (C.22)
and for any ξ[tt¯] ∈ (K(S,X))
t¯−t+1,∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t(dst,−1) · vnt(st1, ξ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯]) < vt(st1, ξ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯]) +
ǫ
2
. (C.23)
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Both (C.22) and (C.23) would be true if∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1,t(dst,−1) · vnt(st1, ξ[tt¯], εst,−1, χ[tt¯]) −→n→+∞ vt(st1, ξ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯]), (C.24)
at an (st1, ξ[tt¯])-independent convergence rate. But this was provided by Proposition 2.
D Proofs of Section 7
Proof of Proposition 3: Since A is discrete, we can denote it by either {a¯1, a¯2, ...} or
{a¯1, ..., a¯I} for some finite I. We work with the former only, as the latter is similarly treatable.
For any n ∈ N, define
Nn = {(n1, n2, ...)|ni = 0, 1, ..., n for each i = 1, 2, ..., and
+∞∑
i=1
ni = n}. (D.1)
For each (n1, n2, ...) ∈ Nn, define A
n
n1n2···
so that
Ann1n2··· = {a ∈ A
n|εa({a¯i}) =
ni
n
for any i = 1, 2, ...}. (D.2)
Note that every Ann1n2··· is symmetric, different A
n
n1n2···
’s are non-overlapping, and
An =
⋃
(n1n2··· )∈Nn
Ann1n2···. (D.3)
Due to the above decomposition, each a ∈ An belongs to its own Ann·εa({a¯1}),n·εa({a¯2}),···.
For any (n1, n2, · · · ) ∈ Nn, the set A
n
n1n2···
contains n!/(
∏+∞
i=1 ni!) distinct members of A
n,
say a1, ..., an!/(
∏+∞
i=1 ni!)
. In addition, every ak is of the form ψa1 for some ψ ∈ Ψn. Thus, due
to qn’s symmetry, for k = 1, 2, ..., n!/(
∏+∞
i=1 ni!),
qn({ak}) =
∏+∞
i=1 ni!
n!
· qn(A
n
n1n2···
). (D.4)
Suppose ni ≥ 1 for some i = 1, 2, .... Then, exactly (n− 1)!/((ni − 1)! ·
∏
j 6=i nj!) of the ak’s
will have ak1 = a¯i. Therefore, for any such ak,
qn(({a¯i} ×A
n−1) ∩Ann1n2···) =
(ni − 1)! ·
∏
j 6=i nj !
(n− 1)!
· qn({ak}) =
ni
n
· qn(A
n
n1n2···
), (D.5)
where the second equality stems from (D.4). The above left- and right-hand sides are cer-
tainly equated as well when ni = 0. Combine (D.3) and (D.5), and we can obtain
qn({a¯i} × A
n−1) =
∑
(n1,n2,...)∈Nn
ni
n
· qn(A
n
n1n2···
). (D.6)
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On the other hand, we have mini 6=j dA(a¯i, a¯j) > 0 due to A’s discreteness. Suppose ǫ > 0
is small enough to be strictly below this constant. Then by the nature of the Prohorov
metric, a ∈ An would satisfy ρA(εa, p) < ǫ if and only if
+∞∑
i=1
| εa({a¯i})− p({a¯i}) |< 2ǫ, (D.7)
and hence only if
+∞
max
i=1
| εa({a¯i})− p({a¯i}) |< ǫ. (D.8)
Since the sequence qn asymptotically resembles p, for any ǫ > 0 that is strictly below
mini 6=j dA(a¯i, a¯j) > 0, we can pick n large enough so that (A.7) and (A.8) in the proof
of Lemma 5 are true. Define N ′n ⊆ Nn so that for any (n1, n2, ...) ∈ N
′
n,
+∞∑
i=1
|
ni
n
− p({a¯i}) |< 2ǫ, and hence
+∞
max
i=1
|
ni
n
− p({a¯i}) |< ǫ. (D.9)
Due to (D.2), (D.3), and (D.7), we have the following for the A′n defined in (A.8):
A′n =
⋃
(n1,n2,...)∈N ′n
Ann1n2···. (D.10)
Now for any i = 1, 2, ..., we have
| qn|A({a¯i})− p({a¯i}) |=| qn({a¯i} ×A
n−1)− p({a¯i}) |
=| (
∑
(n1,n2,...)∈N ′n
+
∑
(n1,n2,...)∈Nn\N ′n
)ni · qn(A
n
n1n2···
)/n− p({a¯i}) |
≤ qn(A
′
n)· | ni/n− p({a¯i}) | +qn(A
n \ A′n) < 2ǫ.
(D.11)
Here, the first equality comes from the definition of marginal probability, the second equality
comes from (D.6), the first inequality can be attributed to (D.10), and the last inequality is
due to (A.7) and (D.8). Thus, for every a ∈ A, we have limn→+∞ qn|A({a}) = p({a}).
Proof Proposition 4: For the time being, it does not matter whether A = {a¯1, a¯2, ...}
or {a¯1, ..., a¯I} for some finite I. The first few steps are the same as those in the proof of
Lemma 5. For any ǫ > 0 and n large enough, we can have (A.7) to (A.11) as in that proof.
Fix i = 1, 2, ... with p({a¯i}) > 0. Due to (A.10),
A′n ∩ ({a¯i} ×A
n−1) ⊆ (A× A′′n−1) ∩ ({a¯i} × A
n−1) = {a¯i} × A
′′
n−1, (D.12)
where A′n is defined in (A.8) and A
′′
n−1 is defined in (A.11). Thus,
qn({a¯i} ×A
′′
n−1) ≥ qn(A
′
n ∩ ({a¯i} × A
n−1)) = qn(({a¯i} ×A
n−1) \ (An \ A′n))
≥ qn({a¯i} × A
n−1)− qn(A
n \ A′n) > qn({a¯i} × A
n−1)− ǫ,
(D.13)
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where the last inequality is due to (A.7).
Since qn is symmetric, we know from Proposition 3 that, when n is large enough,
qn({a¯i} × A
n−1) = qn|A({a¯i}) >
p({a¯i})
2
> 0. (D.14)
Combining (D.13) and (D.14), we can obtain
qn,A|An−1(a¯i|A
′′
n−1) =
qn({a¯i} ×A
′′
n−1)
qn({a¯i} ×An−1)
> 1−
ǫ
qn({a¯i} ×An−1)
> 1−
2ǫ
p({a¯i})
. (D.15)
With A′′n−1’s definition in (A.11), we get qn,A|An−1(a¯i|·)’s asymptotic resemblance to p
n−1.
E Developments in Section 8
Proof of Theorem 4: Let ǫ > 0 be fixed. Given t = 1, 2, ... and χ ∈ K(S,X), we use χt to
denote (χ, χ, ..., χ) ∈ (K(S,X))t. From (38), we know
| v∞n (s1, ξ[1∞], εs−1, χ
∞)− vtn(s1, ξ[1t], εs−1, χ
t) |≤
α¯t · f¯
1− α¯
. (E.1)
Hence, when t ≥ ln(6f¯/(ǫ · (1− α¯)))/ ln(1/α¯) + 1,
v∞n (s1, χ
∞, εs−1, χ
∞) > vtn(s1, χ
t, εs−1, χ
t)−
ǫ
6
, (E.2)
and
v∞n (s1, ξ[1∞], εs−1, χ
∞) < vtn(s1, ξ[1t], εs−1, χ
t) +
ǫ
6
, (E.3)
for every s1 ∈ S, s−1 ∈ S
n−1, and ξ[1∞] ∈ (K(S,X))
∞. Therefore, we need merely to select
such a large t and show that, when n is large enough,∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1(ds−1) · v
t
n(s1, χ
t, εs−1, χ
t) ≥
∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1(ds−1) · v
t
n(s1, ξ[1t], εs−1, χ
t)−
2ǫ
3
, (E.4)
for every s1 ∈ S and ξ[1t] ∈ (K(S,X))
t.
Since (χ, σ) poses as an equilibrium for Γ, we know (36) is true. Another way to write
the condition is, at t′ = 0, for any ξ[1,t′+1] ∈ (K(S,X))
t′+1,
v∞(s, (ξ[1t′], χ
∞), σ, χ∞) ≥ v∞(s, (ξ[1,t′+1], χ
∞), σ, χ∞). (E.5)
Now suppose (E.5) is true for some t′ = 0, 1, .... We are to show its validity at t′ + 1.
By (33), (35), and the uniform convergence of vt(s, ξ[1t], σ, χ
t) to v∞(s, ξ[1∞], σ, χ
∞), we have
v∞(s, ξ[1∞], σ, χ
∞) =
∫
X
ξ1(s|dx) · [f˜(s, x, σ ⊗ χ)
+α¯ ·
∫
S
g˜(s, x, σ ⊗ χ|ds′) · v∞(s′, ξ[2∞], σ, χ
∞)].
(E.6)
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Therefore,
v∞(s, (ξ[1,t′+1], χ
∞), σ, χ∞)− v∞(s, (ξ[1,t′+2], χ
∞), σ, χ∞)
=
∫
X
ξ1(s|dx) ·
∫
S
g˜(s, x, σ ⊗ χ|ds′)×
×[v∞(s′, (ξ[2,t′+1], χ
∞), σ, χ∞)− v∞(s′, (ξ[2,t′+2], χ
∞), σ, χ∞)],
(E.7)
which, by the induction hypothesis (E.5), is positive. Therefore, (E.5) is true for t′ = 0, 1, ....
By using (E.5) multiple times, we can derive that, for any ξ[1t] ∈ (K(S,X))
t,
v∞(s, χ∞, σ, χ∞) ≥ v∞(s, (ξ1, χ
∞), σ, χ∞) ≥ v∞(s, (ξ[12], χ
∞), σ, χ∞)
≥ · · · ≥ v∞(s, (ξ[1,t−1], χ
∞), σt, χ
∞) ≥ v∞(s, (ξ[1t], χ
∞), σ, χ∞).
(E.8)
Also, we know from (34) that
| v∞(s, ζ[1∞], σ, χ
∞)− vt(s, ζ[1t], σ, χ
t) |≤
α¯t · f¯
1− α¯
, (E.9)
regardless of the ζ[1∞] ∈ (K(S,X))
∞ chosen. However, (E.8) and (E.9) would together lead
to
vt(s, χt, σ, χt)− vt(s, ξ[1t], σ, χ
t) ≥ −
2α¯t−1 · f¯
1− α¯
≥ −
ǫ
3
, (E.10)
for any s ∈ S and ξ[1t] ∈ (K(S,X))
t.
In the presence of Assumptions 1 and 2 for the corresponding t-period games, Propo-
sition 2 applies. Plus, it has been hypothesized that the sequence πˆn−1 asymptotically
resembles the sequence σn−1. Therefore, for n large enough,∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1(ds−1) · v
t
n(s1, χ
t, εs−1, χ
t) > vt(s1, χ
t, σ, χt)−
ǫ
6
, (E.11)
regardless of the choice on s1 ∈ S, and∫
Sn−1
πˆn−1(ds−1) · v
t
n(s1, ξ[1t], εs−1, χ
t) < vt(s1, ξ[1t], σ, χ
t) +
ǫ
6
, (E.12)
regardless of the choices on s1 ∈ S and ξ[1t] ∈ (K(S,X))
t. Put (E.10) to (E.12) together,
and we would obtain (E.4).
For something akin to the second example in Section 7, we need to consider the following
invariant equation involving πn ∈ P(S
n), which is inspirable from its finite-t version (28):
πn = πn ⊙ χ
n ⊙ g˜n. (E.13)
Suppose (E.13) has a solution that asymptotically resembles σn, then we can let πˆn−1 =
πn|Sn−1 . By Lemma 5, this choice would satisfy the condition in Theorem 4. Its meaning is
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also clear—let players update their estimates on other players’ states most precisely without
using their own state information.
When the state space S is finite, we again have an extended version much like Theorem 3.
If we succeed in finding a satisfactory πn, we would be able to make the third choice of
letting each πˆn−1(s1|·) in the extended version be the conditional probability πn,S|Sn−1(s1|·).
Propositions 3 and 4 would then lead to the satisfaction of the corresponding condition in
the extended version. The third choice here again means that players update other players’
states in the most accurate Bayesian fashion.
The above second and third choices are premised on the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1 Suppose χ ∈ K(S,X), g˜ ∈ G(S,X) enjoys the continuity of g˜(s, x, τ) in τ
at an (s, x)-independent rate, and σ ∈ P(S) is an solution to the invariant equation σ =
σ⊙χ⊙g˜(·, ·, σ⊗χ) as defined by (32) and (35). Then, there would exist a sequence πn so that
for each n ∈ N, πn as a member of P(S
n) satisfies the invariant equation πn = πn⊙χ
n⊙ g˜n
as indicated by (E.13), and yet the sequence asymptotically resembles the sequence σn.
To tackle this conjecture, one may be tempted to show that (i) iteratively applying
σt+1 = σt ⊙ χ⊙ g˜(·, ·, σt⊗ χ) leads to the convergence of σt to an invariant σ, (ii) iteratively
applying πn,t+1 = πnt ⊙ χ
n ⊙ g˜n leads to the convergence of πnt to an invariant πn for each
n, and (iii) these convergence results along with the asymptotic resemblance of each πnt to
σ nt would lead to that of πn to σ
n. So far, (i) and (ii) still elude us. On the other hand,
something slightly weaker than (iii) can be achieved.
Proposition 5 Let A be a separable metric space, and pi for i ∈ N and p be members of
P(A). Also, for each n ∈ N, let qni for i ∈ N and qn be members of P(A
n). Suppose pi
converges to p, qni converges to qn for each n ∈ N, and qni asymptotically resembles p
n
i .
Then, in either situation (a) where the convergence of qni to qn is at an n-independent rate
or situation (b) where the asymptotic resemblance of qni to p
n
i is at an i-independent rate,
the sequence qn would asymptotically resemble the sequence p
n.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let ǫ > 0 be given. Since pi converges to p, we have
ρA(p, pi) <
ǫ
2
, (E.14)
as long as i is large enough.
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Suppose situation (a) is true. By the equi-n convergence of qni to qn, we can pick i large
enough to ensure both (E.14) and for any n ∈ N,
qn((A
′
n)
ǫ/4) > qni(A
′)−
ǫ
2
, ∀A′n ∈ B(A
n). (E.15)
At such a fixed i ∈ N, due to the asymptotic resemblance of qni to p
n
i , we can let n be large
enough so that
qni({a ∈ A
n|ρA(εa, pi) <
ǫ
4
}) > 1−
ǫ
2
. (E.16)
Suppose situation (b) is true. Due to the equi-i asymptotic resemblance of qni to p
n
i , we can
pick n large enough to ensure (E.16) for any i ∈ N. By the convergence of qni to qn, we can
then pick i large enough to ensure (E.14), as well as (E.15) for the current n ∈ N.
Either way, without loss of generality, we can suppose dAn(a, a
′) ≥ maxnm=1 dA(am, a
′
m).
Then, due to Lemma 1,
({a ∈ An|ρA(εa, pi) <
ǫ
4
})ǫ/4 ⊆ {a ∈ An|ρA(εa, pi) <
ǫ
2
}. (E.17)
Now we can deduce that
qn({a ∈ A
n|ρA(εa, p) < ǫ}) > qn({a ∈ A
n|ρA(εa, pi) < ǫ/2})
> qn(({a ∈ A
n|ρA(εa, pi) < ǫ/4})
ǫ/4)
> qni({a ∈ A
n|ρA(εa, pi) < ǫ/4})− ǫ/2 > 1− ǫ,
(E.18)
where the first inequality is due to (E.14), the second inequality is due to (E.17), the third
inequality is due to (E.15), and the last inequality is due to (E.16). Therefore, the sequence
qn asymptotically resembles the sequence p
n.
Like Propositions 3 and 4, Proposition 5 also helps to bolster the legitimacy of the
asymptotic resemblance concept.
F Developments in Section 9
F.1 The Transient Case
By the discreteness of S, every χt(s|X
′) is automatically continuous and hence measurable
in s, and hence K(S,X) is not only a member of (P(X))S, but also the latter itself. Denote
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the space (P(S))t¯−1 by S and the space ((P(X))S)t¯ = (K(S,X))t¯ by X . Let U = S × X .
Define a correspondence H : U ⇒ U , so that for any σ[2t¯] ∈ S and χ[1t¯] ∈ X ,
H(σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]) = H
S(σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯])×H
X(σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]), (F.1)
where
HS(σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]) = {σ
′
[2t¯] ∈ S|σ
′
t = Tt−1(χt−1) ◦ σt−1, ∀t = 2, 3, ..., t¯}, (F.2)
and
HX(σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]) = {χ
′
[1t¯] ∈ X |χ
′
t(st|X˜t(st, σt, χ[tt¯])) = 1, ∀t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, st ∈ S}. (F.3)
A fixed point (σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]) for H would provide a Markov equilibrium χ[1t¯] for Γ(σ1) in the
sense of (42), with σ[2t¯] supplying the deterministic pre-action environment pathway from
period 2 to t¯ that is generated from all players adopting policy χ[1t¯]. We are to use Kakutani-
Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem to prove the existence of a fixed point for H . But first
let us work out a couple of useful continuity results.
Proposition 6 (i) σ ⊗ χ is continuous in both σ ∈ P(S) and χ ∈ (P(X))S.
When g ∈ G(S,X) satisfies that g(s, x, τ) is continuous in τ at an (s, x)-independent rate,
(ii) σ ⊙ χ⊙ g(·, ·, σ ⊗ χ) is continuous in both σ ∈ P(S) and χ ∈ (P(X))S.
Proof of Proposition 6: We first prove (i) by showing that, for any two sequences σm and
χm that converge to σ and χ, respectively, the sequence σm⊗χm would converge to σ⊗χ. In
the following, we omit detailed reasonings behind some of the steps, as they have appeared
in the proof of Proposition 1.
Fix some ǫ ∈ (0, 1). We can identify some I of its points s¯1, s¯2, ..., s¯I , so that (B.1) is
true. For convenience, let S¯ ′ = {s¯1, s¯2, ..., s¯I} and S¯
′′ = S \ S¯ ′. It is known that the distance
dS(S¯
′, S¯ ′′) = infs′∈S¯′,s′′∈S¯′′ dS(s
′, s′′) > 0. For i, j = 1, 2, ..., I, use dij for dS(s¯i, s¯j) and σi for
σ({s¯i}). Again, define δ through (B.2), whose strict positivity is guaranteed.
As σm and χm converge to σ and χ, respectively, for large enough m, we have
ρS(σ, σm) < δ, (F.4)
and
ρX(χ(s¯i), χm(s¯i)) < δ, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., I. (F.5)
Together with the fact that δ ≤ dS(S¯
′, S¯ ′′) ∧ (mini 6=j dij), (F.4) would result with
σi − δ < σm({s¯i}) < σi + δ. (F.6)
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Meanwhile, (F.5) would lead to
χm(s¯i|X
′) < χ(s¯i|(X
′)δ) + δ, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., I. (F.7)
Any U ′ ∈ B(S × X) still enjoys the decomposition provided in (B.12), that U ′ =
(
⋃I
i=1{s¯i} ×X
′
i)
⋃
U ′′, where X ′i ∈ B(X) for i = 1, 2, ..., I, while U
′′ is such that s′′ ∈ S¯ ′′ for
any (s′′, x′′) ∈ U ′′. This would result in the same (B.13). On the other hand, from the right
half of (F.6) and (F.7),
(σm ⊗ χm)({s¯i} ×X
′
i) = σm({s¯i}) · χm(s¯i|X
′
i) < (σi + δ) · [χ(s¯i|(X
′
i)
δ) + δ]
≤ (σ ⊗ χ)({s¯i} × (X
′
i)
δ) + 2δ + δ2 < (σ ⊗ χ)({s¯i} × (X
′
i)
δ) + 3δ,
(F.8)
where the last inequality is due to our choice that δ ≤ ǫ/I < 1. Meanwhile,
(σm ⊗ χm)(U
′′) ≤ (σm ⊗ χm)(S¯
′′ ×X) = σm(S¯
′′) = 1−
∑I
i=1 σm({s¯i})
< 1−
∑I
i=1 σi + Iδ < ǫ+ Iδ,
(F.9)
where the second-to-last inequality is due to the left half of (F.6) and the last one is due
to (B.1). By combining (B.12), (B.13), (F.8), and (F.9), we can obtain
(σm ⊗ χm)(U
′) < (σ ⊗ χ)((U ′)δ) + ǫ+ 4Iδ. (F.10)
Thus,
ρS×X(σm ⊗ χm, σ ⊗ χ) < ǫ+ 4Iδ ≤ 5ǫ. (F.11)
Since (F.11) is to occur at any m that is large enough, we see that (i) is true.
We then prove (ii). Again, suppose two sequences σm and χm converge to σ and χ,
respectively. From (i), we know σm⊗ χm converges to σ⊗ χ too. According to (87) of Yang
[33], for any m,
ρX(σm ⊙ χm, σ ⊙ χ) = ρX((σm ⊗ χm)|X , (σ ⊗ χ)|X) ≤ ρS×X(σm ⊗ χm, σ ⊗ χ). (F.12)
Hence, there is also the convergence of σm ⊙ χm to σ ⊙ χ.
On the other hand, the discrete property of S × X means g(·, ·, τ) is a member of
(P(S))S×X for any fixed τ ∈ P(S ×X). Now (i) and the fact that g(s, x, τ) is continuous in
τ at an (s, x)-independent rate would together mean that, the sequence g(·, ·, σm ⊗ χm) in
(P(S))S×X converges to g(·, ·, σ ⊗ χ).
Let us use the convergence of σm ⊙ χm to σ ⊙ χ under proper substitutions. As S ×X
has been noted to be discrete, we can treat it as S in the convergence result. Also, let us
treat σm ⊗ χm as σm, σ ⊗ χ as σ, S as X , g(·, ·, σm ⊗ χm) as χm, and g(·, ·, σ ⊗ χ) as χ.
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From (i) on the convergence of σm⊗χm to σ⊗χ, now viewed as that of σm to σ, as well
as the convergence of g(·, ·, σm⊗χm) to g(·, ·, σ⊗χ), now viewed as that of χm to χ, we can
conclude that (σm ⊗ χm)⊙ g(·, ·, σm ⊗ χm) = σm ⊙ χm ⊙ g(·, ·, σm ⊗ χm) would converge to
(σ ⊗ χ)⊙ g(·, ·, σ ⊗ χ) = σ ⊙ χ⊙ g(·, ·, σ ⊗ χ). Thus, (ii) is true as well.
Proposition 7 For each t = 1, 2, ..., t¯ + 1, the value vt(st, ξ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯]) defined in (22) is
continuous in σt ∈ S and χ[tt¯] ∈ X at an (st, ξ[tt¯])-independent rate.
Proof of Proposition 7: We use induction on t. By (21), our claim is certainly true for
t = t¯ + 1. Suppose for some t = t¯, t¯ − 1, ..., 1, the function vt+1(st+1, ξ[t+1,t¯], σt+1, χ[t+1,t¯]) is
continuous in σt+1 and χ[t+1,t¯] at a rate independent of st+1 and ξ[t+1,t¯].
Now we prove the continuity in σt and χ[tt¯] at time t. From (22), we have
sup
st∈S,ξ[tt¯]∈((P(X))
S )t¯−t+1
| vt(st, ξ[tt¯], σt, χ[tt¯])− vt(st, ξ[tt¯], σ
′
t, χ
′
[tt¯]) |≤M1 +M2 +M3, (F.13)
where
M1 = sup
(st,xt)∈S×X
| f˜t(st, xt, σt ⊗ χt)− f˜t(st, xt, σ
′
t ⊗ χ
′
t) |, (F.14)
M2 = sup(st,xt)∈S×X, ξ[t+1,t¯]∈((P(X))S )t¯−t | [
∫
S
g˜t(st, xt, σt ⊗ χt|dst+1)
−
∫
S
g˜t(st, xt, σ
′
t ⊗ χ
′
t|dst+1)] · vt+1(st+1, ξ[t+1,t¯], Tt(χt) ◦ σt, χ[t+1,t¯]) |,
(F.15)
and
M3 = sup(st,xt)∈S×X, ξ[t+1,t¯]∈((P(X))S )t¯−t
∫
S
g˜t(st, xt, σ
′
t ⊗ χ
′
t|dst+1)×
× | vt+1(st+1, ξ[t+1,t¯], Tt(χt) ◦ σt, χ[t+1,t¯])− vt+1(st+1, ξ[t+1,t¯], Tt(χ
′
t) ◦ σ
′
t, χ
′
[t+1,t¯]) | .
(F.16)
By part (i) of Proposition 6, σ′t ⊗ χ
′
t can be made arbitrarily close to σt ⊗ χt by letting
(σ′t, χ
′
t) be close enough to (σt, χt). Then due to Assumption 2, M1 can be made arbitrarily
small by doing the same.
Again, suppose S = {s¯1, s¯2, ...}. We use the simplified notation that
γ
(′)
i (st, xt) = gt(st, xt, σ
(′)
t ⊗ χ
(′)
t |{s¯i}), (F.17)
and
vi(ξ[t+1,t¯]) = vt+1(s¯i, ξ[t+1,t¯], Tt(χt) ◦ σt, χ[t+1,t¯]). (F.18)
Then, (F.15) can be expressed as M2 equaling
sup
(st,xt)∈S×X, ξ[t+1,t¯]∈((P(X))
S )t¯−t
|
∑
i
γi(st, xt) · vi(ξ[t+1,t¯])−
∑
i
γ′i(st, xt) · vi(ξ[t+1,t¯]) | . (F.19)
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Let I(st, xt) be the set of i’s that induce γi(st, xt) ≥ γ
′
i(st, xt). Note the | vi(ξ[t+1,t¯]) |’s are
bounded, say by v, due to the boundedness of the f˜t′ ’s and the finiteness of t¯. Then, (F.19)
would lead to
M2 ≤ 2v · sup
(st,xt)∈S×X
∑
i∈I(st,xt)
(γi(st, xt)− γ
′
i(st, xt)). (F.20)
For δ below infs 6=s′ dS(s, s
′), the event ρS(g˜t(st, xt, σt⊗χt), g˜t(st, xt, σ
′
t⊗χ
′
t)) < δ would trigger
∑
i∈I(st,xt)
(γi(st, xt)− γ
′
i(st, xt)) < δ, (F.21)
for every (st, xt) ∈ S × X ; consult (C.18) in the proof of Proposition 2. But due to As-
sumption 1, the convergence of σ′t ⊗ χ
′
t to σt ⊗ χt means that we can make g˜t(st, xt, σ
′
t ⊗ χ
′
t)
arbitrarily close to g˜t(st, xt, σt⊗χt), at a rate that is independent of (st, xt). Hence, by (F.20),
M2 can be made arbitrarily small by letting (σ
′
t, χ
′
t) get close enough to (σt, χt).
From (F.16), we can get
M3 ≤ supst+1∈S, ξ[t+1,t¯]∈((P(X))S )t¯−t | vt+1(st+1, ξ[t+1,t¯], Tt(χt) ◦ σt, χ[t+1,t¯])
−vt+1(st+1, ξ[t+1,t¯], Tt(χ
′
t) ◦ σ
′
t, χ
′
[t+1,t¯]) | .
(F.22)
By part (ii) of Proposition 6, Tt(χ
′
t) ◦ σ
′
t = σ
′
t ⊙ χ
′
t ⊙ g˜t(·, ·, σ
′
t ⊗ χ
′
t) can be made arbitrarily
close to Tt(χt) ◦ σt = σt ⊙ χt ⊙ g˜t(·, ·, σt ⊗ χt) by letting (σ
′
t, χ
′
t) be close enough to (σt, χt).
By the induction hypothesis, M3 can be made arbitrarily small by doing the same.
We have thus completed the induction process.
Here comes the conditional-equilibrium existence result for the transient case.
Theorem 5 The correspondence H allows for a fixed point (σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]), which supplies the
game Γ(σ1) with an conditional equilibrium χ[1t¯].
Proof of Theorem 5: Due to S’s discreteness, P(S) is the simplex in R|S|, whether | S |
be finite or infinite, and hence is compact; the same applies to P(X). Thus, U is a compact
subset of the vector space R|S|
t¯−1+|X||S|·t¯, understood as R∞ if either S or X is infinite.
For any finite-dimensional Rk, we can take the norm || · || so that || r ||=
∑k
l=1 | rl | /k
for each r = (rl|l = 1, ..., k) ∈ R
k, whereas for the infinite-dimensional R∞, we can let
|| r ||=
∑+∞
l=1 | rl | /2
l for each r = (rl|l = 1, 2, ...) ∈ R
∞. A norm thus defined would
provide the same convergence as does the weak convergence under Prohorov metric. Since
the convex combination of two probabilities is still a probability, U is also convex.
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For any (σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]) ∈ U , the set H(σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]) is certainly non-empty, for we can construct
some (σ′[2t¯], χ
′
[1t¯]) belonging to it. First, for t = 2, 3, ..., t¯, we simply let σ
′
t = Tt−1(χt−1) ◦σt−1.
Then, for t = 1, 2, ..., t¯ and s ∈ S, let χ′t(s) be any measure that assigns its full weight to the
set of x’s that attain the maximum value supy∈X vt(s, (δy, χ[t+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯]).
Now we show that HS : U ⇒ S and HX : U ⇒ X are closed- and convex-valued, as
well as upper hemi-continuous. These would lead to the same properties for H . According
to (F.2), each HS(σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]) contains exactly one point, and hence is automatically closed
and convex. For the upper hemi-continuity property, we need only to show that the value
contained in HS(σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]) moves continuously with both σ[2t¯] and χ[1t¯]. But this has been
guaranteed by part (ii) of Proposition 6.
According to (F.3), each HX(σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]) is a set of probability vectors, with each compo-
nent probability assigning the full measure to a particular measurable set. This set of prob-
ability vectors is certainly convex. To show that it is closed, suppose χ′m,[1t¯] for m = 1, 2, ...
form a sequence in HX(σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]) that converges to a given χ
′
[1t¯]. We are to show that
χ′[1t¯] ∈ H
X(σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]). (F.23)
Now for any t = 1, 2, ..., t¯, s ∈ S, and ǫ > 0, as long as m is large enough,
χ′t(s|(X˜t(s, σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]))
ǫ) ≥ χ′mt(s|X˜t(s, σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]))− ǫ = 1− ǫ. (F.24)
Due to the arbitrariness of ǫ, this means χ′t(s|X˜t(s, σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯])) = 1, and hence (F.23) is true.
We now show that HX is upper hemi-continuous. Let σm,[2t¯] be a sequence in S that
converges to a given σ[2t¯], χm,[1t¯] a sequence in X that converges to a given χ[1t¯], and χ
′
m,[1t¯]
another sequence in X that converges to a given χ′[1t¯]. Suppose for each m = 1, 2, ...,
χ′m,[1t¯] ∈ H
X(σm,[2t¯], χm,[1t¯]), (F.25)
we are to show that
χ′[1t¯] ∈ H
X(σ[2t¯], χ[1t¯]). (F.26)
By (F.3), we see that (F.25) for each m indicates that, for each t = 1, 2, ..., t¯ and s ∈ S,
χ′mt(s|X˜t(s, σmt, χm,[tt¯])) = 1; (F.27)
whereas, (F.26) boils down to that, for each t = 1, 2, ..., t¯ and s ∈ S,
χ′t(s|X˜t(s, σt, χ[tt¯])) = 1. (F.28)
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We fix some t and s. Let ǫ > 0 be small enough, so that there is no need to distinguish
between (X ′)ǫ and X ′ for any X ′ ⊆ X . Now since χ′mt converges to χ
′
t, for m large enough,
χ′t(s|X˜t(s, σt, χ[tt¯])) = χ
′
t(s|(X˜t(s, σt, χ[tt¯]))
ǫ) ≥ χ′mt(s|X˜t(s, σt, χ[tt¯]))− ǫ. (F.29)
For the time being, suppose X˜t(s, σt, χ[tt¯]) is known to be upper hemi-continuous in (σt, χ[tt¯]).
By also noting the hypothesis on the convergence of σmt to σt and that of χm,[tt¯] to χ[tt¯], we
can obtain, for m large enough,
X˜t(s, σmt, χm,[tt¯]) ⊆ (X˜t(s, σt, χ[tt¯]))
ǫ = X˜t(s, σt, χ[tt¯]). (F.30)
Thus, for m large enough,
χ′t(s|X˜t(s, σt, χ[tt¯])) ≥ χ
′
mt(s|X˜t(s, σt, χ[tt¯]))− ǫ ≥ χ
′
mt(s|X˜t(s, σmt, χm,[tt¯]))− ǫ, (F.31)
which, according to (F.27), is above 1 − ǫ. In view of the arbitrariness of ǫ, we can
achieve (F.28).
We now come back to the upper hemi-continuity of X˜t(s, ·) as a correspondence from
P(S) × ((P(X))S)t¯−t+1 to X . Suppose σmt converges to σt, χm,[tt¯] converges to χ[tt¯], and
xm converges to x. For every m = 1, 2, ..., suppose xm ∈ X˜t(s, σmt, χm,[tt¯]), which, by (43),
means
vt(s, (δxm , χm,[t+1,t¯]), σmt, χm,[tt¯]) ≥ vt(s, (δy, χm,[t+1,t¯]), σmt, χm,[tt¯]), ∀y ∈ X. (F.32)
By X ’s discreteness, xm would be x for sufficiently large m. This, combined with Proposi-
tion 7 and the hypothesis on the convergence of σmt to σt and that of χm,[tt¯] to χ[tt¯], would
entail that, for any ǫ > 0, as long as m is large enough,
vt(s, (δx, χ[t+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯]) ≥ vt(s, (δx, χm,[t+1,t¯]), σmt, χm,[tt¯])− ǫ
= vt(s, (δxm , χm,[t+1,t¯]), σmt, χm,[tt¯])− ǫ
≥ vt(s, (δy, χm,[t+1,t¯]), σmt, χm,[tt¯])− ǫ ≥ vt(s, (δy, χ[t+1,t¯]), σt, χ[tt¯])− 2ǫ,
(F.33)
for any y ∈ X . Since ǫ can be arbitrarily small, we see from (43) that x ∈ X˜t(s, σt, χ[tt¯]).
Thus we have the upper hemi-continuity of X˜t(s, ·).
In summary, H is a non-empty, closed- and convex-valued, as well as upper hemi-
continuous correspondence on the compact and convex subset U that is embedded in a
normed linear topological space. We can therefore apply the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed
point theorem to verify that H has a fixed point.
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F.2 The Stationary Case
Denote the space P(S) by S∞ and the space (P(X))
S by X∞. Let U∞ = S∞ × X∞. Define
a correspondence H∞ : U∞ ⇒ U∞, so that for any σ ∈ S∞ and χ ∈ X∞,
H∞(σ, χ) = H
S
∞(σ, χ)×H
X
∞(σ, χ), (F.34)
where
HS∞(σ, χ) = {σ
′ ∈ S∞|σ
′ = T (χ) ◦ σ}, (F.35)
and
HX∞(σ, χ) = {χ
′ ∈ X∞|χ
′(s|X˜∞(s, σ, χ)) = 1, ∀s ∈ S}. (F.36)
A fixed point (σ, χ) for H∞ would provide a stationary Markov equilibrium χ for the
stationary nonatomic game Γ∞ in the sense of (44), with σ supplying the invariant deter-
ministic environment that is generated from all players adopting policy χ. To show that
such an equilibrium exists, we first need the following consequence of Proposition 7.
Proposition 8 The value v∞(s, ξ[1∞], σ, χ
∞) defined in (33) is continuous in σ ∈ S∞ and
χ ∈ X∞ at an (s, ξ[1∞])-independent rate.
Proof of Proposition 8: From (34), we see that
| v∞(s, ξ[1∞], σ, χ
∞)− vt(s, ξ[1t], σ, χ
t) |≤
α¯t · f
1− α¯
. (F.37)
Thus, for any ǫ > 0, by fixing at a large enough t, we can ensure
| v∞(s, ξ[1∞], σ
′′, (χ′′)∞)− vt(s, ξ[1t], σ
′′, (χ′′)t) |<
ǫ
3
, (F.38)
for any s, ξ[1∞], σ
′′, and χ′′. At the same time, Proposition 7 means that, for (σ′, χ′) close
enough to any given (σ, χ), we can guarantee
| vt(s, ξ[1t], σ, χ
t)− vt(s, ξ[1t], σ
′, (χ′)t) |<
ǫ
3
, (F.39)
for any s and ξ[1t]. Then,
| v∞(s, ξ[1∞], σ, χ
∞)− v∞(s, ξ[1∞], σ
′, (χ′)∞) |≤| v∞(s, ξ[1∞], σ, χ
∞)
−vt(s, ξ[1t], σ, χ
t) | + | vt(s, ξ[1t], σ, χ
t)− vt(s, ξ[1t], σ
′, (χ′)t) |
+ | vt(s, ξ[1t], σ
′, (χ′)t)− v∞(s, ξ[1∞], σ
′, (χ′)∞) |< ǫ.
(F.40)
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Thus, v∞(s, ξ[1∞], σ, χ
∞) is continuous in (σ, χ) at an (s, ξ[1∞])-independent rate.
We can then have the desired conditional-equilibrium existence result by using the Kakutani-
Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem.
Theorem 6 The correspondence H∞ allows for a fixed point (σ, χ), which supplies the game
Γ∞ with an equilibrium χ.
Proof of Theorem 6: Due to the discreteness of S and X , U∞ is a compact subset of the
vector space R|S|+|X|
|S|
, understood as R∞ if either S or X is infinite. Regardless of whether
the space is finite- or infinite-dimensional, we can take the norm adopted in the proof of
Theorem 5. Since the convex combination of two probabilities is still a probability, U∞ is
convex.
Using virtually the same corresponding arguments in the proof of Theorem 5, we can
show that H∞(σ, χ) at any (σ, χ) ∈ U∞ is non-empty, closed, and convex. We separate the
upper hemi-continuity of H∞ into that for H
S
∞ and that for H
X
∞.
The upper hemi-continuity of HS∞ again comes from Proposition 6. Furthermore, we can
use almost the same arguments from (F.32) to (F.33), this time relying on Proposition 8
instead of Proposition 7, to show that X˜∞(s, ·) as a correspondence from P(S)× (P(X))
S to
X is upper hemi-continuous. Then, using almost the same arguments from (F.25) to (F.31),
we can verify that HX∞ is upper hemi-continuous.
With all these properties, we can apply the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem
to verify that H∞ has a fixed point.
References
[1] Adlakha, S. and B. Johari. 2013. Mean Field Equilibrium in Dynamic Games with
Complementarities. Operations Research, 61, pp. 971-989.
[2] Al-Najjar, N.I. and R. Smorodinsky. 2001. Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games.
Games and Economic Behavior, 37, pp. 26-39.
[3] Al-Najjar, N.I. 2008. Large Games and the Law of Large Numbers. Games and Economic
Behavior, 64, pp. 1-34.
51
[4] Balder, E.J. 2002. A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results.
Journal of Economic Theory, 102, pp. 437-470.
[5] Balder, E.J. 2008. Comments on Purification in Continuous Games. International Jour-
nal of Game Theory, 37, pp. 73-92.
[6] Bergin, J. and D. Bernhardt. 1995. Anonymous Sequential Games: Existence and Char-
acterization of Equilibria. Economic Theory, 5, pp. 461-489.
[7] Bodoh-Creed, A.L. 2012. Approximation of Large Dynamic Games. Working Paper,
Cornell University.
[8] Carmona, G. 2004. Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players. Working
Paper, Universidade Nova de Lisboa.
[9] Duffie, D., J. Geanakoplos, A. Mas-Colell, and A. McLennan. 1994. Stationary Markov
Equilibria. Econometrica, 62, pp. 745-781.
[10] Dvoretzky, A., J. Kiefer, and J. Wolfolwitz. 1956. Asymptotic Minimax Character of
the Sample Distribution Function and of the Classical Multinomial Estimator. Annals
of Mathematical Statistics, 27, pp. 642-669.
[11] Ethier, S.N. and T.G. Kurtz. 1986. Markov Processes: Characterization and Conver-
gence. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
[12] Green, E.J. 1980. Non-cooperative Price Taking in Large Dynamic Markets. Journal of
Economic Theory. 22, pp. 155-182.
[13] Green, E.J. 1984. Continuum and Finite-player Noncooperative Models of Competition.
Econometrica, 52, pp. 975-993.
[14] Hopenhayn, H.A. 1992. Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium.
Econometrica, 60, pp. 1127-1150.
[15] Housman, D. 1988. Infinite Player Noncooperative Games and the Continuity of the
Nash Equilibrium Correspondence. Mathematics of Operations Research, 13, pp. 488-
496.
[16] Jovanovic, B. and R.W. Rosenthal. 1988. Anonymous Sequential Games. Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 17, pp. 77-88.
52
[17] Kalai, E. 2004. Large Robust Games. Econometrica, 72, pp. 1631-1665.
[18] Khan, M.A., K.P. Rath, and Y.N. Sun. 1997. On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equi-
librium in Games with a Continuum of Players. Journal of Economic Theory, 76, pp.
13-46.
[19] Khan, M.A., K.P. Rath, Y.N. Sun, and H. Yu. 2013. Large Games with a Bio-social
Typology. Journal of Economic Theory, 148, 1122-1149.
[20] Khan, M.A. and Y.N. Sun. 1990. On a Reformulation of Cournot-Nash Equilibria.
Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 146, pp. 442-460.
[21] Khan, M.A. and Y.N. Sun. 1995. Pure Strategies in Games with Private Information.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 24, pp. 633-653.
[22] Khan, M.A. and Y.N. Sun. 1999. Non-cooperative Games on Hyperfinite Loeb Space.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 31, pp. 455-492.
[23] Khan, M.A. and Y.N. Sun. 2002. Non-cooperative Games with Many Players. In R.J.
Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
Volume 3, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, pp. 1761-1808.
[24] Mas-Colell, A. 1984. On a Theorem of Schmeidler. Journal of Mathematical Economics,
13, pp. 201-206.
[25] Mertens, J.F. and T. Parthasarathy. 1987. Equalibria for Discounted Stochastic Games.
CORE Discussion Paper No. 8750.
[26] Parthasarathy, K.R. 2005. Probability Measures on Metric Spaces. AMS Chelsea Pub-
lishing, Providence, Rhode Island.
[27] Sabourian, H. 1990. Anonymous Repeated Games with a Large Number of Players and
Random Outcomes. Journal of Economic Theory, 51, pp. 92-110.
[28] Schmeidler, D. 1973. Equilibrium Points of Nonatomic Games. Journal of Statistical
Physics, 7, pp. 295-300.
[29] Shapley, L.S. 1953. Stochastic Games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
39, pp. 1095-1100.
53
[30] Solan, E. 1998. Discounted Stochastic Games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 23,
pp. 1010-1021.
[31] Weintraub, G.Y., C. L. Benkard, and B. van Roy. 2008. Markov Perfect Industry Dy-
namics with Many Firms. Econometrica, 76, pp. 1375-1411.
[32] Weintraub, G.Y., C. L. Benkard, and B. van Roy. 2011. Industry Dynamics: Foundations
for Models with an Infinite Number of Firms. Journal of Economic Theory, 146, pp.
504-527.
[33] Yang, J. 2011. Asymptotic Interpretations for Equilibria of Nonatomic Games. Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 47, pp. 491-499.
[34] Yang, J. 2015. Analysis of Markovian Competitive Situations using Nonatomic Games—
the Shock-driven Case. Working Paper, Rutgers University.
[35] Yang, J. and Y. Xia. 2013. A Nonatomic-game Approach to Dynamic Pricing under
Competition. Production and Operations Management, 22, pp. 88-103.
[36] Yu, H. and Z. Zhang. 2007. Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with Countable Actions.
Journal of Mathematical Econonomics, 43, pp. 192-200.
54
